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INTRODUCTION
Much of the recent debate in Luther studies concerns Luther's relationship to
his medieval predecessors and to his humanist contemporaries. Were the
contributions of medieval theologians, and especially the late medieval scholastics, a
vital component in Luther's theology, or does he owe more to the contributions of
Renaissance humanism? For example, Heiko Oberman emphasizes the importance of
late medieval nominalism as representing the "harvest" of medieval theological
investigation.' According to Oberman, Luther directly benefited from this harvest by
his entrance into the Augustinian order in Erfurt, and this Augustinian nominalism
was decisive for his theological development.' A view contrary to Oberman's is
proposed by Lewis Spitz. Spitz emphasizes Luther's rejection of scholasticism and
his positive attitude toward the humanist disciplines as key elements in the
Reformation.3

'Heiko A. Oberman, The Harvest of Medieval Theology: Gabriel Biel and Late
Medieval Nominalism (Grand Rapids: William P. Eerdmanns, 1967).
'Heiko A. Oberman, "Headwaters of the Reformation: Initia Lutheri—Initia
Reformationis" in Luther and the Dawn of the Modern Era, ed. Heiko A. Oberman
(Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1974), 40-88.
W. Spitz, "Headwaters of the Reformation: Studia Humanitatis, Luther
Senior, et Initia Reformationis" in Luther and the Dawn of the Modern Era, ed. Heiko
A. Oberman (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1974), 89-116.
3Lewis
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Luther's ecclesiology provides fruitful ground for testing the validity of these
hypotheses. The development of Luther's doctrine of the church continues to
generate interest,4 especially in regard to the question of Luther's relationship to the
medieval theologians. The earliest statements of Luther's doctrine of the church,
those found in his first lectures on the Psalms, have been treated in this regard by
Scott Hendrix.5 Hendrix has isolated specific themes found both in Luther and in
medieval commentators on the Psalms for the purpose of comparison. The study
presented here will approach Luther's statements on authority in the church,
specifically the authority of the papacy and general councils, in much the same way.
Since it has been suggested that Luther was influenced during his conflict with the
pope by conciliarist theology,6 the fifteenth-century conciliarists provide an obvious
point of comparison. Because both Theodor Kolde and Christa Tecklenburg Johns
have examined Luther's position on conciliar authority in this light,' some
justification must be presented for yet another study on this topic.

Michael Beyer, "Luthers Ekldesiologie," in Leben und Werk Martin Luthers von
1526 bis 1546, 2 vols. (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1983), 98-117.
4Cf.

H. Hendrix, Ecclesia in Via: Ecclesiological Developments in the Medieval
Psalms Exegesis and the Dictata Super Psalterium (1513-1515) of Martin Luther (Leiden:
E. J. Brill, 1974).
5Scott

6See for example Remigius Balmer, Martin Luther und der Papst, 5th ed. (Minster:
Aschendorff, 1970), 36-42.

"Th. Kolde, Luthers Stellung zu Conch und Kirche bis zum Wormser Reichstag, 1521
(Giitersloh: C. Bertelsmann, 1876); Christa Tecklenburg Johns, Luthers Konzilsidee in
ihrer historischen Bedingtheit und ihrem refonnatorischen Neuansatz (Berlin: Alfred
Topelmann, 1966).
2
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Both Kolde and Johns treated conciliar theory in general terms and used broad
strokes in describing conciliar ecclesiology. Although this certainly does not negate
their conclusions, a point by point comparison between Luther and a single
representative of conciliarism might prove useful in the continuing evaluation of
Luther's relationship to his predecessors.
Jean Gerson is by no means an arbitrary choice for such a comparison. As
one of the foremost representatives of fifteenth century conciliarism, his influence as a
theologian was felt throughout the fifteenth and at the beginning of the sixteenth
centuries, especially but not exclusively in conciliarist circles.' In addition, he was
one of the few late medieval theologians whom Luther genuinely admired. Luther
often quoted Gerson's views with approval, particularly with regard to the
phenomenon of spiritual Anfechtungen. Finally, Gerson and Luther experienced
similar theological training. Both were educated at nominalist universities, and both
displayed an interest in mystical theology. Gerson is a natural point of comparison
between Luther and late medieval thought.
The present study attempts to make such a comparison in the area of
ecclesiology. Chapter 1 briefly outlines the influences, academic and otherwise, that

"Johannes Gerson kann zu Recht als MaBgebliche Autoritat fiir diejenigen
franzosischen und deutschen Theologen des 15. wie des beginnenden 16. Jahrhunderts
bezeichnet werden . . ." Christoph Burger, Aedificatio, Fructus, Utilitas: Johannes
Gerson als Proffesor der Theologie und Kanzler der Universitat Paris (Tiibingen: J. C.
B. Mohr, 1986), 10. According to Remigius Balmer, Gerson's views permeate the
writings of conciliarists in the early sixteenth century. Nachwirkungen des konziliaren
Gedankens in der Theologie und Kanonistik des fruhen 16. Jahrhunderts (Minster:
Aschendorff, 1971).
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shaped Gerson's thought. This is followed by a detailed discussion of one of
Gerson's conciliar treatises, De Auctoritate Concilli, in Chapter 2. Chapter 3
highlights several of Gerson's other conciliar treatises and developments in
conciliarism from the Council of Constance to the end of the fifteenth century. The
discussion of Luther begins in Chapter 4 with a sampling of influences relative to his
theological development. Chapter 5 outlines the development of Luther's view of the
authority of the papacy and general councils. Chapter 6 presents a comparison
between Gerson and Luther on the subject of authority in the church and draws some
general conclusions about Luther's relationship to conciliarism, late medieval
scholasticism and humanism.

CHAPTER 1
JEAN GERSON: FORMATIVE INFLUENCES
In order to understand Gerson's statements on authority in the church, it is
necessary to explore the intellectual and political climate that influenced the
development of his thought. Gerson was a product of the scholarship that had
preceded him at the University of Paris, especially the nominalist tradition as
represented in his day by Pierre d'Ailly. In addition, he was influenced by the
writings of theologians of a more mystical bent, such as Pseudo-Dionysius and
Bonaventure. Gerson's intellectual development was also affected by the more
pernicious influence of the papal schism that had divided the church. Much of his
activity both as chancellor of the University of Paris and as doctor of theology was
directed toward healing the schism. Nominalism, mysticism, and the schism all
helped to shape Gerson's thought.

Gerson and the Schism
When Jean le Charlier was born in Gerson-les-Barbey, the popes had resided
at Avignon for 56 years.' Shortly after he began his studies at the University of

'The best biography of Gerson is still Johann Baptist Schwab, Johannes Gerson:
Professor der Theologie and Kanzler der Universittit Pans, 2 vols. (Wiirzburg, 1858;
reprint, New York: Burt Franklin). Also helpful are John B. Morrall, Gerson and the
Great Schism (Manchester: The University Press, 1960) and James L. Connolly, John
Gerson: Reformer and Mystic (St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1928).
5
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Paris, the return of the papacy to Rome resulted in schism when Clement VII was
elected pope by the French cardinals as rival to the newly-elected Roman pope, Urban
VI. Thus the Great Western Schism provided the background for Gerson's education
and early career.' This event was supremely important for the development of his
thought. Many of his ecclesiological writings were directed toward specific events
associated with the schism, underscoring the fact that his larger doctrine of the church
was shaped by his experience in attempting to restore unity to a divided Christendom.
Jean Gerson entered the University of Paris as a member of the College of
Navarre in 1377.3 Here he first encountered his mentor and lifelong friend Pierre
d'Ailly, who became rector of Navarre in 1380 and chancellor of the university in

'General works on the history of the schism include John Holland Smith, The Great
Schism (New York: Weybright and Talley, 1970); E. Delaruelle, E.-R. Labande, and
Paul Ourliac, L'Eglise au temps du Grand Schisme et de la crise conciliaire (1378-1449)
(Paris: Bloud & Gay, 1962); Clinton Locke, The Age of the Great Western Schism (New
York: The Christian Literature Company, 1896); Louis Salembier, The Great Schism
of the West, trans. M. D. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Truebner, and Company,
1907); Louis Gayet, Le Grand Schisme d'Occident, 2 vols. (Florence: Loescher et
Seeber, 1889). Gayet's work concludes with the election of Clement VII and includes
selections from contemporary documents from the Vatican archives. The intellectual
history of the schism is treated by Walter Ullmann, The Origins of the Great Schism: A
Study in Fourteenth-Century Ecclesiastical History (London: Barnes, Oates, &
Washbourne, 1948); George Jefferis Jordan, The Inner History of the Great Schism
(London: William & Norgate, 1930). The classic work on the schism and the kingdom
of France is Noel Valois, La France et le Grand Schisme d'Occident, 4 vols. (Paris:
Alphonse Picard et Fils, 1902). For a collection of primary sources relative to the
schism see C. M. D. Crowder, Unity, Heresy and Reform, 1378-1460: The Conciliar
Response to the Great Schism (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977).
Schwab, 57. A brief history of the college of Navarre is found on 66-67.

3
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1389.4 In 1381, Gerson received the Bachelor of Arts degree and began to
study theology at the university. His program progressed with the aid of d'Ailly, and
when the latter was appointed almoner and confessor to Charles VI, King of France,
Gerson was invited to preach at court.5 In a sermon preached before the king,
Gerson first discussed publicly the need to end the schism.' As a result of his
appearances at court, he obtained the patronage of the king's powerful uncle, Philip,
Duke of Burgundy.' Thus his rise through the ranks of the ecclesiastical hierarchy
was assured.
Gerson's interest in the schism increased as he progressed through the
academic ranks at the University of Paris. A portion of the disputation for his
master's degree, argued under the topic De jurisdictione spirituali, concerned the

'Works on d'Ailly include Louis Salembier, Le Cardinal Pierre d'Ailly, Chancelier
de l'Universite de Paris, Eveque du Pay et Cambrai 1350-1420 (Tourcoing: Georges
Frere, 1932); Paul Tschackert, Peter von Ailli (Petrus de Alliaco): Zur Geschichte des
Grossen Abendliindischen Schisma und der Reformconcilien von Pisa und Constance
(Gotha: Perthes, 1877); Alan E. Bernstein, Pierre d'Ailly and the Blanchard Affair:
University and Chancellor of Paris at the Beginning of the Great Schism (Leiden: E. J.
Brill, 1978); Francis Oakley, The Political Thought of Pierre d'Ailly: The Voluntarist
Tradition (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1964); Agnes Elizabeth Roberts,
"Pierre d'Ailly and the Council of Constance: A Study in 'Ockhamite' Theory and
Practice," Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 4th ser., vol.18, (London, 1935),
123-42.
'Schwab, 87.
6This

was on Epiphany, 6 January 1391. According to Valois, Gerson "did not omit
to mix in with printed reflections on the feast of the day numerous allusions to the
present situation." 2:395.
'By 1393 Gerson had been appointed almoner to the duke and later in that year
received from him a benefice in Bruges. Morrall, 6.
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schism.' Gerson soon received his doctorate in theology, and when d'Ailly resigned
his position as chancellor in 1395, Gerson was chosen to succeed him.' It was a
difficult period for the university since it was greatly concerned with finding a way to
heal the schism.1° In 1394 before Gerson assumed the duties of chancellor, the
university had voted in favor of the voluntary abdication of both popes, the via
cessionis." By 1398, however, when it became clear that Benedict XIII, the
Clementine pope, would not abdicate despite his promises made before assuming the
tiara, the university supported a withdrawal of obedience from him by the kingdom of
prance.12 Opposing the position of his patron, the Duke of Burgundy, Gerson

"Ibid., 34.
'Schwab, 96-97.
°On the universities and the conciliar movement see R. N. Swanson, Universities,
Academics and the Great Schism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); idem,
"The University of Cologne and the Great Schism," Journal of Ecclesiastical History
28:1-15; F. J. P. Bliemetzrieder, "Antwort der Universitat Wien an diejenige zu Paris,
12 Mai 1396, wegen der Zession der Beiden Papste," Studien und Mitteilungen aus dem
Benedicter- und dem Cistercienser-Orden 24 (1903):100-105; Margaret Harvey, "The
Letters of the University of Oxford on Withdrawal of Obedience from Pope Boniface
IX," Studies in Church History 11 (1975):187-98; idem, "The Letter of Oxford
University on the Schism, 5 February 1399," Annuarium Historiae Conciliorum 6
(1974):121-34; Walter Ullmann, "The University of Cambridge and the Great Schism,"
Journal of Theological Studies N. S. 9 (1958):53-77; Dieter Girgensohn, "Die
Universitat Wien und das Konstanzer Konzil," in Das Konzil von Konstanz: Beitrage zur
seine Geschichte und Theologie, F. S. Hermann Schaufele, ed. August Franzen and
Wolfgang Muller (Freiburg, Basel, Wien: Herder, 1964), 252-81; Antony Black, "The
Universities and the Council of Basle: Ecclesiology and Tactics," Annuarium Historiae
Conciliorum 6 (1974):341-51.
"Valois, 3:33-37.
'Ibid., 140-41.
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disapproved of the withdrawal and refused to vote." Gerson supported Benedict,
not from a conviction that he was the true pope, but because Gerson felt continued
obedience to him on the part of France was "the sole way open to peace."' When
Benedict was besieged at Avignon and then held prisoner by the French, Gerson
retired to his benefice at Bruges and even considered resigning as chancellor."
When obedience was restored to Benedict in 1403, Gerson resumed his
attempts to end the schism. Although at this time many seriously proposed the via
concilii, that is, turning the matter over to the decision of a general council, Gerson
held to the via cessionis. He supported the idea of a council only after unproductive
visits to the rival popes in 1407 and 1408.16 Thus when the Council of Pisa was
summoned by a coalition of rebellious cardinals from both obediences, Gerson backed
it wholeheartedly.
The Council of Pisa, which Gerson himself did not attend, deposed both popes
and elected a third, Alexander V, who was soon succeeded by John MIL Since
neither the pope at Rome nor the pope at Avignon recognized Pisa's sentence of

'Ibid., 165, 180.
'Connolly, 64-65.
"Morrall, 11.
'In 1406, Gerson proclaimed the triumph of the via cessionis when Gregory XII
voiced a willingness to abdicate. Valois, 3:479-80. Gerson, in his visit to Avignon
during the winter of 1403-1404, had already noted Benedict's reluctance to follow the
via cessionis. However, the chancellor still hoped to negotiate a settlement along these
lines as part of an embassy to both popes in 1407-1408, when petty disagreements
between the two popes revealed that neither desired to withdraw his claim to the papacy.
Morrall, 12.
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deposition, the council merely succeeded in making the schism a three-way affair.
Therefore a second council was called at Constance in 1414.
Gerson arrived at Constance as head of the French delegation in February of
1415." There he played a leading role in the condemnation of Jan Hus," preached
on several occasions at the request of the council,' and served on a commission
appointed to examine the question of canonizing Bridget of Sweden.' However, his
overriding concern was the dispute with Jean Petit over the doctrine of tyrranicide, an
issue Gerson took up before the council at the request of the king of France.' Petit
was under investigation for defending the murder of the Duke of Orleans by the
Burgundian faction. Gerson, in spite of his patronage by the Duke of Burgundy,
argued the case against Petit at Constance. As John Morrall points out, the issue was
perhaps more important for what it prevented than for what it accomplished.

"Connolly, 175.
'EOn the trial of Hus at Constance see Peter of Mladonovice, John Hus at the Council
of Constance, trans. Matthew Spinka, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965);
Eustace J. Kitts, Pope John the Twenty-third and Master John Hus of Bohemia, (London:
Constable and Comp., Ltd., 1910); Emile de Bonnechose, Reformers Before the
Reformation. The Fifteenth Century. John Huss and the Council of Constance, trans.
Campbell Mackenzie, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1844); Schwab, 527-609.
'Gerson preached on a number of occasions at Constance. The most important of
these sermons were Ambulate dum lucem habetis , which was delivered on 23 March 1415
and dealt with the defection of John XXIII from the council, and Prosperum iter,
preached three days after the departure of Emperor Sigismund to negotiate the abdication
of Benedict XIII. Jean Gerson, Oeuvres Completes, ed. by P. Glorieux (Paris: Desclez
& Cie., 1960-1973), 5:39-50, 471-80.
"Schwab, 364-67.
'Valois, 3:315-20; Schwab, 609-46.
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Gerson, the only leader of the first rank [at Constance] who remained
uncommitted by office to a vested interest in postponing reform, was deprived
by his extremism in the Petit affair from exercising his due influence.'
Whether the reason was the Petit affair or not, Gerson remained in the background of
the debate concerning the authority of the council over the pope.23
Gerson paid a price for his relentless opposition to Petit. The Burgundian
faction had won the upper hand in Paris during Gerson's absence at Constance, and as
a result he was never able to resume his duties at the university. He spent the last ten
years of his life in Lyons, where his brother was prior of the Celestine convent.
Gerson devoted his days there to contemplation, correspondence, and the education of
choirboys until his death in 1429. 24

Nominalism and Mysticism
Numerous philosophers, theologians and mystics contributed to Gerson's
development through their writings. Augustine, according to D. Catherine Brown,
played the largest role of any of the fathers in Gerson's French sermons.25 G. H.
M. Posthumus-Meyjes states, "No theologian had more significance for Gerson than

22

Morrall, 95.

'Louis Pascoe believes that Gerson's relative inactivity at Constance can be
explained by his lack of interest in the specific areas of reform undertaken at the council.
Louis B. Pascoe, Jean Gerson: Principles of Church Reform (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1973),
13.
24

Morrall, 16; Schwab, 758-73.

'D. Catherine Brown, Pastor and Laity in the Theology of Jean Gerson (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1987), 29.
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the doctor seraphicus, Bonaventure."' In addition, Gerson had no doubt absorbed
the ideas of the great conciliar thinkers at the University of Paris, Conrad of
Gelnhausen and Henry of Langenstein, although he also differed with them on a
number of points.' In general terms, however, there is no doubt Gerson's thought
owes its shape to two great influences: nominalism and mysticism.
According to Johann Schwab, Gerson's studies at the University of Paris under
Pierre d'Ailly were sufficient evidence of his nominalist theology.' Walter Dress
agrees in emphasizing Gerson's adherence to nominalism, at least in theory. In
addition, he points out that Gerson was greatly influenced by the neoplatonic
mysticism of Pseudo-Dionysius.29 Although in many points nominalism and
mysticism are mutually exclusive schools of thought, Gerson succeeded, according to
Dress, in steering a middle course between the two. Following Ockham, he
emphasized the positive meaning of the law and the sovereign will of God. However,

26G. H. M. Posthumus-Meyjes, Jean Gerson: Zijn Kerkpolitiek en Ecclesiologie ('SGravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963), 296.

'Connolly's statement that in 1407 Gerson "was converted fully to the doctrine of
Henry of Langenstein" is true only in the general sense that he embraced the idea of
calling for a council to end the schism, 169-70. As Pascoe points out, Gerson refused
to follow Langenstein in depriving the papacy of real authority, making it "merely an
institution of the church gathered in council," 29.
"Schwab, 291.
'Walter Dress, Die Theologie Gersons: Eine Untersuchung zur verbindung von
Nominalismus and Mystik im Spiitmittelalter (Giitersloh: C. Bertelsmann, 1931), 75-76.
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in contrast to Ockham, Gerson needed to find a way to make an "inner connection"
between the human spirit and church authority. He found it in mystical theology.30
Two principal objections have been noted in regard to this interpretation of
Gerson's nominalism and mysticism. First of all, Andre Combes emphasizes the
independent nature of Gerson's thought and minimizes his dependence on nominalism.
He characterizes the role d'Ailly played in Gerson's development as that of simply
setting him on his course. In discussing Ockham's influence on Gerson in general, he
states, "Ockham is far from imposing himself on Gerson as an exclusive or principal
master."' According to Combes, Gerson was predominantly a mystical thinker who
was only slightly influenced by nominalism.
Combes is certainly correct in emphasizing the importance of mysticism in
Gerson's theology. However, the influence of nominalism cannot be discounted.
Gerson's education was nominalist in orientation, and this training shows itself in his
writings. As David Schmiel points out, Gerson, in the tradition of Pseudo-Dionysius,
followed both the via propria of traditional theology and the via mystica.32 Thus we
find nominalism and mysticism, in varying degrees, throughout Gerson's theology.
The second difficulty lies in the reinterpretation of nominalism advocated by
Heiko Oberman. According to Oberman, nominalist thought did not destroy the great
"Ibid., 10-11, 29.
'Andre Combes, Jean Gerson: Commentateur Dionysien, 2 vols. (Paris: Librarie
Philosophique J. Vrin, 1940), 1:426-27.
'David Schmiel, Via Propria and Via Mystica in the Theology of Jean le Charlier
de Gerson, Graduate Study No. X, School for Graduate Studies, Concordia Seminary,
St. Louis, Missouri (St. Louis: Oliver Slave, Ltd., 1969), 5-6.
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synthesis of theology and philosophy achieved in the Middle Ages. The result of
nominalist theology was not a lack of confidence in the stability of the created order
but rather a new understanding of God's work de potentia ordinata. Rather than
depend on the ability of reason to discover truth, the nominalists emphasized the
reliability of God's covenants. Oberman sees in Gerson a vindication for this more
positive view of nominalism as well as an argument for the basic compatibility of
nominalism and mysticism. The latter is achieved by crediting to Gerson a new
understanding of the nature of the mystical union.
If, however, we find one of Gerson's descriptions of mysticism acceptable,
according to which mysticism is the outreach of the soul to a union with God
through the desire of love, which resides not in the intellective but in the
affective power of the soul and has not the verum but the bonum as its object,
we find that the sources themselves allow for an affective type of mysticism
which in nominalistic circles replaced speculative mysticism.33
The object of mystical union is not the essence of God, which would be an
unattainable goal for the nominalist, but the will of God, which lies within the
potentia ordinata and is therefore attainable within the nominalist system. Thus,
according to Oberman, Gerson achieved a workable synthesis of nominalism and
mysticism.
There are, however, numerous difficulties with this view. Oberman himself
admits the type of mysticism espoused by Gerson later in life is "an essentialistic type
of mysticism hardly compatible with the philosophy of Occam."34 In addition, as

0berman, Harvest, 331.

33

'Ibid., 316.
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Steven Ozment points out, Oberman's use of Gerson's definition of mysticism is
suspect. In this definition, conformitas voluntatis is seen by Oberman as conformity
to God's revealed will. Ozment maintains the term means something quite different.
The conformitas voluntatis of mystical union, an extremely rare experience
granted a few chosen viatores in this life, normally refers to a special contact
with God beyond that possible within and through the ordained means of grace
(the potentia ordinata); it is momentary yet real communion with the Will of
God (potentia absoluta!) above his will system of salvation . . . .35
The conformitas voluntatis, therefore, is not compatible with nominalist theology and,
Ozment argues, any mysticism which aims for less is no mysticism at all.
One conformed in will with God in mystical union has not only reaped the
fullest possible benefits from the ordained media of salvation, but has also
risen above them to God himself. Until the latter movement is made, until the
potentia ordinata is transcended, it can be argued that there is, properly
speaking, no mysticism.'
There can be no true synthesis of nominalism and mysticism without seriously
compromising one or the other. As Ozment concludes, "mysticism and nominalism
appear to be diametrically opposed in their basic ideological bents."37
What then was the relationship between nominalism and mysticism in Gerson's
thought? Ozment describes Gerson's mystical theology as a penitential-affective

Steven Ozment, "Mysticism, Nominalism and Dissent," The Pursuit of Holiness
in Late Medieval and Renaissance Religion, ed. Charles Trinkaus with Heiko A.
Oberman (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1974), 71.
35

36

1bid., 71.
Ibid., 91.

37
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mysticism centered in the adherence of man's spirit to God through intimate love.'
Gerson believed the knowledge of God gained through mystical experience was
superior to that acquired through intellectual investigation because of "the greater
purity of the affective powers post peccatum Adae."39 Gerson did not minimize the
importance of speculative theology but saw it as being in "a correlative and reciprocal
relationship" with mystical theology." However, this is far from the "synthesis" of
nominalism and mysticism described by Oberman.'
In the final analysis Gerson's mysticism must be seen as an attempt to
transcend the limitations of the nominalist system. In dealing with the concrete
problems of the schism, this dimension of his thought is not readily apparent.
Nevertheless traces of Gerson's unique theological outlook can be found in his
ecclesiological writings. As will be seen, both nominalism and mysticism informed
and shaped his doctrine of the church.

"Steven E. Ozment, Homo Spiritualis: A Comparative Study of the Anthropology of
Johannes Tauler, Jean Gerson and Martin Luther (1509-16) in the Context of Their
Theological Thought (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1969), 73.
"Ibid., 71.
'Emphasis in original. Ibid., 64. See also Johann Stelzenberger, Die Mystik des
Johannes Gerson (Breslau: Mullur & Seiffert, 1928), 54.
'Although David Schmiel also speaks of a synthesis in Gerson's theology, his
conclusions are similar to Ozment's in emphasizing the superiority of the via mystica to
the via propria, 95.

CHAPTER 2
DE AUCTORITATE CONCILII: GERSON'S CONCILIAR ECCLESIOLOGY
The latter part of 1408 and the first months of 1409 found Jean Gerson
working diligently for the success of the Council of Pisa, set to convene on 25 March
1409. One of the documents Gerson produced during this period, the treatise
commonly referred to as De auctoritate concilii, is the subject of this investigation of
his ecclesiology.' Internal evidence indicates this document must be dated between
15 November 1408 and 25 March 1409, that is, after the opposition council convoked
by Benedict XIII but before the proposed beginning of the Council of Pisa.'
Although Gerson would have been a fairly recent convert to the conciliar position at
this time, his concern for the welfare of the church led him to champion the conciliar

'Jean Gerson, Oeuvres Completes, ed. by P. Glorieux (Paris: Desclee & Cie., 19601973) 6:114-23. All translations are mine unless otherwise noted.
'The third doubt of the tenth article of De auctoritate concilii refers to Benedict's
council in the past tense and also speaks of the gathering at Pisa which is yet to take
place: ". . ., vel ista quae facta est per Benedictum in festo Omnium Sanctorum, vel
praesens de qua agimus quae per dominos cardinales a consentientibus nominatis
cardinalibus apud alios Pisis existentibus, fiet XXV Martii." De auctoritate concilii,
Article 10, (hereafter cited as DAC, 10). See also Z. Rueger, "Le 'De Auctoritate
Concilii' de Gerson," Revue d'Histoire Ecclesiastique 53 (1958), p.777. Gerson's
numbering of the years of the schism in De auctoritate concilii seems to favor the latter
part of 1408 as the time of its composition, if not necessarily of its publication. DAC,
14: ". . ., quia jam duravit praesens schisma per xxxi annos completos." Compare this
to the reference in Propositio facta coram Anglicis, delivered on 29 January 1409: ". . .,
portentum jam xxxii annos habens, schisma pestiferum . . .," G 6:127.
17

cause with the same boldness which he had shown earlier in opposing the subtraction
of obedience from Benedict.3 In De auctoritate concilii, Gerson attempted to smooth
the path for the impending gathering by making it clear that a general council of the
church, even one called without papal consent, is legitimate and has sufficient
authority to deal with the problems of the schism.
This treatise has only recently been added to the catalog of Gerson's works.
Zophia Rueger first published her edition of De auctoritate concilii in 1958, although
all four manuscript copies on which it is based were known in the nineteenth
century.' The treatise is not found in Ellies Du Pin's edition of Gerson's works
published in 1706, but it has been included in P. Glorieux's modern edition.5 There
is no doubt that Gerson is the author of De auctoritate concilii. The best manuscript
of this treatise is bound in a collection of Gerson's writings; another specifically
names him as author in its superscription.' Further evidence of Gerson's authorship
is the close relationship between De auctoritate and his address to the English

3

Morrall, 41-43.

'Rueger, 775.
Because De auctoritate concilii was not included in the Du Pin edition, it was
condemned to obscurity until Rueger's article and its subsequent inclusion in Glorieux's
edition. The reason that this treatise did not come to light as an authentic work of
Gerson at a much earlier date must remain a matter of speculation.
5

'The manuscript which Rueger refers to as "le plus parfait et probablement
l'archetype" is in the library of the Cathedral Chapter of Notre-Dame. The
superscription is found in the manuscript Cod. Guelf. Helmst. 376 in the library at
Wolfenbiittel. Rueger quotes it as follows: "Johannis Gerson tractatus de auctoritate
congregationis fidelium . . . editus Constantiae." She adds that this led P. Glorieux to
his initial, and erroneous, conclusion that the writing dated from the time of the Council
of Constance. Rueger, 775-76.
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delegation in January 1409, the Propositio facta coram Anglicis. He based this
speech on a text from the prophet Hosea: "Congregabuntur filii Israel et filii Juda
parker et ponent sibi caput unum et ascendent de terra quia magnus dies Israel."'
The final article of De auctoritate contains a reference to this same verse.' In
addition, both documents reject the same statement of Henry of Langenstein that even
if Christ had not instituted the office of the papacy the church itself had power to do
SO.

9

De auctoritate concilii presents itself as an ideal document for the study of
Gerson's view of the church and authority for a number of reasons. Not the least of
these is that this treatise deals directly with the subject of authority in the church and
how that authority is exercised. In addition, De auctoritate has not been subjected to
a great deal of study in the secondary literature, since it has only become widely

7

G 6:126.

"Decimus quartus articulus et ultimus. Cum verbo Dei per Osee os ex persona
Domini pro tempore currenti prophetatum, videlicet 'congregabuntur filii Juda et filii
Israel pariter ut constituent sibimet caput unum . . ." The last sentence of this article,
which is somewhat obscure, seemingly refers to another document: "Et comprehendentur
sub numero xxxi, quia jam duravit praesens schisma per xxxi annos completos." This
is probably not a reference to Propositio facia coram Anglicis since it is not arranged in
thirty-one articles or statements. DAC, 14. See also Posthumus Meyjes, 132, note 5.
9s . . . nec, ut opinor, voluisset unquam oppositum sentire praefatus magister
Henricus de Hassia dum ponit quod Ecclesia posset sibi instituere summum pontificem
si non fuisset immediate constitutus a Christo." Propositio facta coram Anglicis, G
6:132. "Falsa est assertio de Hassia in qua dicit quod esto quod Christus nullum
discipulorum constituisset sibi generalem vicarium, Ecclesia catholica habuisset
potestatem talem constituendi." DAC, 1.6. See also Rueger, 777-778.
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available with the editions of Rueger and Glorieux.' Yet this treatise is worthy of
further study as a significant link in the chain of Gerson's conciliar writings. Along
with Propositio facta coram Anglicis and Tractatus de unitate Ecclesiae, De
auctoritate concilii reveals Gerson's mind on the eve of the Council of Pisa, a time of
tremendous significance in the history of the conciliar movement."
De auctoritate consists of fourteen principal articles, most of which are
followed by a number of conclusions in support of or drawn from the general
statement of the article. The content of this treatise will be considered here under the
topics "Council and Hierarchy" and "Council and Authority."
Council and Hierarchy
An emphasis on the importance of the church's hierarchy was a vital
component of Gerson's ecclesiology and an element that distinguished him from more
radical conciliarists. Posthumus Meyjes has characterized this emphasis on hierarchy
as the "main line" of Gerson's ecclesiology.12 The importance of the hierarchy in

"Those who have studied this treatise since its publication include, of course, Rueger
who made brief comments on its major points in connection with her edition of the text.
John B. Morrall and G. H. M. Posthumus Meyjes both treat De auctoritate briefly in
their studies of Gerson's ecclesiology. De auctoritate is not cited by Louis Pascoe,
although he ranges far and wide through Gerson's writings and frequently uses the
closely related Propositio facta coram Anglicis.
"Franz Bliemetzrieder defends his choice of the Council of Pisa as the terminus ad
quem of his study by pointing to the significance of this council as marking the
acceptance of conciliar thinking and the opening of the conciliar era. He quotes Cardinal
Fillastre: "Origo generalis concilii Constantiensis ex Pisano cepit." Das Generalkonzil
im Grossen Abendlandischen Schisma (Paderborn: Ferdinand Sch6ningh, 1904), vi.
12Posthumus

Meyjes, 210.
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Gerson's conception of the church is obvious in De auctoritate. The responsibility of
the ecclesiastical hierarchy for the condition of the church and its authority to deal
with the schism are principle themes of the treatise.
The first article of De auctoritate begins by affirming the hierarchical structure
of the church.
Christ Jesus, Son of God the Father and Son of Man, established the Christian
church beautifully formed, distinct with various ranks, offices and stations.'
The ecclesiastical hierarchy was instituted by Christ himself and is an indispensable
part of the church. Gerson specifically emphasizes that it was "Christ the man" who
ordered the church in this way." The church with its hierarchy is not the result of a
gradual development in the centuries after Christ. Rather it came into being as a
direct result of Christ's action during his earthly ministry and continues to exist as his
mystical body." As an essential part of this mystical body, it was necessary that the
ecclesiastical hierarchy exist from the very beginning.
Scriptural formulations were, of course, vital to this conception of the church.
In particular, Gerson owed much to the Pauline epistles and their frequent depiction
of the church as the body of Christ. This image obviously serves as the source of
much though not all of Gerson's thinking on the nature of the church. In De
auctoritate, Gerson quotes 1 Corinthians 12 as proof that offices in the church have

13"Christus Jesus, Dei Patris et hominis filius, Ecclesiam christianam instituit
pulchriformem, statibus, officiis et gradibus variis distinctam." DAC 1.1.

DAC 1.2.

14

"DAC 1.3.
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been instituted by Christ and will endure until the end of the world." This Pauline
emphasis on the church as the body of Christ somewhat tempers Gerson's elevated
view of the ecclesiastical hierarchy. His conception of the different offices in the
church is that of the members of the corpus mysticum Ecclesiae working together for
the good of the whole.17
However, Gerson's conception of the church moves beyond Scriptural
formulations to embrace mystical theology. For him the hierarchy of the church on
earth mirrored the hierarchy of the church in heaven. In this he followed the idea of
angelic triads found in the De coelesti hierarchia of Pseudo-Dionysius.'8 According
to Gerson, the triads of angels in heaven are reflected in triads of ecclesiastical offices
on earth, not only in their structure but in their functions of illuminating, purging and
perfecting. Those corresponding to the first triad of angels, the pope and cardinals,
illuminate, purge and perfect those below them. The members of the second triad,
the patriarchs, archbishops, bishops, and priests, are the object of the action of the
first triad and in turn exercise their functions of illumination, purgation and perfection

I6

DAC 9.1.

"Pascoe observes: "While transforming the Pauline concept of office into one of a
primarily hierarchical nature, Gerson, nonetheless, situates the thrust of hierarchical
order within the context of the edification of the mystical body." Principles of Church
Reform, 38.
"Pascoe offers an especially good discussion of this aspect of Gerson's ecclesiology,
Ibid., 17-22.
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on the members of the third triad, the laity and the religious!' The use of celestial
archetypes reveals Gerson's indebtedness to medieval ecclesiology and, as Louis
Pascoe points out, places him firmly in the tradition of such theologians as Augustine,
Gregory the Great, and Isidore of Seville." Although Gerson's reliance on the idea
of a celestial hierarchy reflected in the church is not specifically expressed in De
auctoritate, it must be regarded as an essential component of his definition of the
corpus mysticum Ecclesiae.
Gerson never doubts that Christ's institution of a permanent hierarchy for his
church included the office of the papacy. In De auctoritate the pope is acknowledged
as the vicar of Christ and referred to as the "secondary head" of the church.21 Little

"Sumamus exemplum materiale conforme, prout tradidit Dionysius, spirituali, quod
invenitur in sole qui fons luminis est non illuminatis ab alio corpore sed illuminans;
deinde sunt aliqua quae ab eo illuminantur et consequenter illuminant; nonnulla vero quae
illuminantur sed illuminandi virtute carent, quoniam in ipsis lux occumbit. Exemplum
aliud est in angelica triplici hierarchia. Unde licet quoad naturam, gratiam et gloriam
sit quilibet angelus immediate formatus a Deo, nihilominus quoad exercitium actuum
hierarchicorum qui sunt purgare, illuminare et perficere, tres primi ordines hierarchizant
non hierarchizati ab aliis; tres medii hierarchizantur et hierarchizant; tres infimi
hierarchizantur et non alios angelos hierarchizant. Papalis auctoritas suo modo cum suis
cardinalibus imitatur triplicitatem primam; alteram vero mediam imitatur patriarchalis,
archiepiscopalis, episcopalis et sacerdotalis auctoritas in habentibus subjectos sibi; quod
dicitur propter curatos vel etiam propter solum titulares episcopos carentes plebe. Ultimi
sunt instar tertiae hierarchiae qui hierarchizantur in Ecclesia sed non alios auctoritative
hierarchizant, quemadmodum sunt populi et simplices religiosi secundum Dionysium."
De potestate ecclesiastica, G 6:227.
19

"Pascoe, Principles of Church Reform, 21.
'DAC 2. The views of Conrad of Gelnhausen, as summarized by Bliemetzrieder,
are very similar to those of Gerson in this matter: "Primar ist die heilige katholische
Kirche der mystische Leib Jesu Christi . . . . Der Papst ist von dem ersten, indefektiblen
Haupt, Jesus Christus, zum Stellvertreter, zum sekundaren Haupt bestellt worden . . ."
Bliemetzrieder, 67-68.

24
more is said about the role of the papacy in the church since Gerson is concerned
with the position and authority of the general council. However, he clearly does not
wish to dispense with the office of the papacy or its authority. He specifically rejects
the assertion by Henry of Langenstein that if Christ had not established the office of
the papacy, the church had power to do so.22
Yet it is essential to Gerson's argument to assert that the unity of the church
does not consist in the office of the papacy. He states that the unity of the church has
been established by Christ himself and is maintained in the church apart from the
pope.
The whole Christian church, even when the papal throne is vacant or hindered,
is one body by statute of Christ the man, an authentic college and
congregation.'
The church does not stand or fall with the pope because the whole church and its
hierarchy have been established by Christ apart from the papacy. The hierarchy is
sustained by the power of Christ himself and not by its connection to the papal office.
The lack of a "secondary head" for the body of Christ, or a lack of clarity concerning
who that head might be, does not destroy the unity of the body because Christ himself

Gerson: "Falsa est assertio de Hassia in qua dicit quod esto quod Christus nullum
discipulorum constituisset sibi generalem vicarium, Ecclesia catholica habuisset
potestatem talem constituendi." DAC, 1.6. The statement to which Gerson refers is
from Langenstein's Consilium Pads, Ch. 14: "Quod, esto, quod Christus nullus
discipulorum constituisset sibi generalem vicarium in terns adhuc Ecclesia habuit
potestatem talem sibi constituisset. Et spiritu sancto docente constituisset." Quoted in
Rueger, 778, note 2.
'"Ecclesia christiana tota, etiam sede papal vacante aut impedita, Christi hominis
statuto est unum corpus, collegium et congregatio authentica." DAC 1.5.
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continues to function as its head. In Propositio facta coram Anglicis Gerson
expresses this idea as the semen Dei that is always within the church and enables its
hierarchy to function?'
According to Gerson, the unity of the mystical body of Christ can be
expressed even in a general council called without papal consent. Because he has no
intention of depriving the pope of his rightful authority, he admits that normally the
universal church is gathered in council only by the pope. However, in the situation
of the schism where the identity of the true pope is in question and neither pope
intends to call for a true general council, such a council not only may but must be
summoned by other means. In this case, "certain of the faithful are able to make a
solemn and authentic congregation representing the universal church. "25 Although
this wording does not specifically preclude lay involvement in summoning the council,
Gerson explains there is a hierarchical order to be followed in defining "certain of the
faithful."

24Speaking

to the English delegation to Pisa Gerson stated: "Habemus praeterea
causam quodammodo formalem, et ad hujus celebrationem concilii vivificepraeparantem;
quae forma est semen Dei vivum et efficax, semen Spiritus Sancti habens virtutem
formativam et reformativam totius unitatis, totius Ecclesiae corporis in una fide, et spe,
et caritate sub uno Deo et Domino, per omnem juncturam secundum deductionem
Apostoli ad Eph. iv." Propositio Facta Coram Anglicis, 126. See also Steven E.
Ozment, "The University and the Church: Patterns of Reform in Jean Gerson"
Medievalia et Humanistica, New Series, 1 (1970):119, and Scott H. Hendrix, "In Quest
of the Vera Ecclesia: The Crises of Late Medieval Ecclesiology," Viator 7 (1976): 367.
25"aliqui fideles possent congregationem universalem Ecclesiam repraesentantem,

solemnem et authenticam facere" DAC 3.1.
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If the pope is unwilling or hindered, de jure or de facto, convocation of the
whole faithful in one . . . extends to the faithful and catholic cardinals.'
If the pope and cardinals are unable or unwilling to summon a general council, the
bishops must take responsibility for assembling the faithful.' This authority need
not move beyond the college of bishops to the simple religious or laity even
theoretically, since it is impossible for all of the bishops to die or fall into heresy "as
long as the Christian law is in effect. "28 For Gerson the church even apart from the
papacy and college of cardinals remains firmly hierarchical.
The question of legitimate convocation of a general council was of vital
importance for the Council of Pisa. This is one of three "doubtful matters" which
Gerson addresses in the tenth article of De auctoritate.
The third doubt: Which of the three congregations is and ought to be reckoned
(as necessary for salvation by a faithful catholic anywhere) sufficient and valid
for terminating the present damnable schism: either that which will be
celebrated by Gregory at the feast of Pentecost, or that which was celebrated
by Benedict at the Feast of All Saints, or the present one for which we are
acting, which, through the lords cardinals by the agreement of the [newly]
named cardinals among others residing at Pisa, will be celebrated on the 25th
of March."
26

"Papa nolente aut impedito, de jure vel de facto, ad cardinales fideles et catholicos
pertinet universitatis fidelium in unum . . . convocatio." DAC 3.2.
27

DAC 3.3.

DAC 3.4.

28

""Tertium dubium : quae ex tribus congregationibus est et reputari debet de
necessitate salutis a quolibet fideli catholico sufficiens et valida ad terminandum praesens
schisma damnabile, vel ills quae fiet per Gregorium in festo Pentecostes, vel ista quae
facta est per Benedictum in festo Omnium Sanctorum, vel praesens de qua agimus quae
per dominos cardinales a consentientibus nominatis cardinalibus apud alios Pisis
existentibus, fiet xxv Martii." DAC 10.3. The cardinales nominati were those cardinals
newly created by Gregory XII in May 1408. They abandoned Gregory and, gathered in

27
In discussing this question, Gerson asserts that papal convocation alone is not
sufficient to determine a council's legitimacy. A gathering of the faithful does not
become a general council simply because it has been called by either Benedict or
Gregory." Neither is their consent necessary for calling a general council. Instead
the church is able to gather "legitimately and canonically" without papal consent.'
According to Gerson, this opinion had been held by the whole of Christendom
throughout the thirty-one years of the schism?' Thus the council summoned by the
cardinals gathered in Pisa will indeed be a "holy gathering."33
The hierarchical nature of the church is reflected not only in the convocation
but also in the composition of a general council. Gerson does state that "all Catholic
Christians willing to be present ought to be received"' at Pisa and that all Christians
are bound to furnish their "help, counsel and favor" for this gathering.' However,

Pisa, called for a general council. Gregory's cardinals were soon joined by most of
Benedict's cardinals (domini cardinales) and together they summoned the Council of
Pisa. Both Benedict and Gregory summoned their own councils. Benedict's had
gathered at Perpignan on November 1, 1408; Gregory's, which had not yet met when
Gerson wrote, assembled at Cividale on June 6, 1409. See Bliemetzrieder, 271-72, and
J. N. D. Kelly, The Oxford Dictionary of the Popes (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1986), 232-36.
DAC 10.3.1.

30

'DAC 10.3.3.
DAC 10.3.2.

32

DAC 10.3.4.

33

34

"debent recipi omnes christiani catholici volentes interesse." DAC 9.8.

'"De necessitate salutis quilibet christianus tenetur praestare laborantibus pro hac
conventione facta auxilium, consilium et favorem." DAC 11.10.
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he gives no specific place to the laity or simple religious in the decision making
process. In fact, their presence is not required. For Gerson, a general council, like
the church itself, is essentially hierarchical." The sufficiency of the council is based
on the offices that exist within the church by divine command? Because these
offices suffice for "knowing, asserting and confirming all truth necessary or useful for
. . . the termination of any doubts which have arisen or are about to arise concerning
the rule of christendom,"" those who hold office in the church are indispensable to
the council. The council is primarily a governing body. It is "the church which has
been gathered governing the affairs of the universal church" and exists as such "not
only because it represents the universal church but because it has this special privilege
from Christ."" The general council is not primarily an assembly representative of
all who make up the church but an assembly of those who wield its authority.
Therefore cardinals, archbishops, bishops, abbots and doctors are its principal
members.

36

D. Catherine Brown has observed, "[Gerson] does, of course, from time to time,
along with most medieval theologians, refer to the church as the congregation of the
faithful. This definition was a commonplace by the High Middle Ages. But for all
practical purposes, the visible church, for Gerson, is hierarchical and clerical." Pastor
and Laity, 39.
n DAC 9.
38"

. . . sufficientes ad sciendum, enuntiandum et confirmandum omnem veritatem
necessariam aut utilem pro . . . terminatione cujuscumque dubii exorti aut exorturi circa
regimine christianitatis." DAC 9.4.

"Ecclesia congregata vices universalis Ecclesiae gerens, non solum quia universalem
Ecclesiam repraesentat sed quia hoc habet speciale a Christo privilegium, est
inobliquabilis secundum legem." DAC 5.6.
39
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Council and Authority
The general council emerges from Gerson's pen as an exercise in hierarchical
authority. The greater part of De auctoritate is concerned with defining that
authority, especially in relation to the papacy.
Central to Gerson's discussion of a general council's authority is the belief that
such a council cannot err in matters of faith.
It is not possible, as long as the law of Christ is in effect, for a general council
(that is, the universal church gathered out of necessity) to err in determining
the truths of the faith or those things necessary or useful for the rule of the
universal church.'
This idea touches not only the authority of the council once it has gathered but
already the necessity of its convocation. A general council, Gerson asserts, not only
may but must be gathered for consultation "concerning a matter of faith or condition
of the universal church, such as the present schism which touches the whole
ecclesiastical condition."'" A council is necessary because the pope, acting on his
own, is fallible even in matters of faith. He is infallible only when he acts in concert
with a general council.
The pope is able to err in faith, but it is not possible for the pope along with a
council of the church to judge erroneously in a matter of faith."
""Non est possibile, stante lege Christi, concilium generale aut universalem
Ecclesiam congregatam debite in determinando veritates fidei aut necessarias vel utiles
pro regimine Ecclesiae errare." DAC 5.1.
'"de materia fidei aut statu universalis Ecclesiae, sicut est praesens schisma quod
tangit totum statum ecclesiasticum" DAC 5.3.
42"

Papa potest errare in fide, sed non est possibile papam cum concilio Ecclesiae
erronee in materia fidei sententiare." DAC 5.2.
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Simply consulting such a council, therefore, is not an option for the pope. Rather he
"is bound to make use of a council of the church and of the bishops."'
Gerson argues that the general council as representative of the universal church
is the bearer of the inerrancy ascribed to the church. Therefore the definition of a
general council—who or what constitutes it—assumes great significance. On this
point Gerson distances himself both from the ardent papalists and from the radical
conciliarists.
For Gerson, as has already been observed, the presence of the pope was not
enough to constitute a general council. Neither would Gerson accept the argument
that the pope and his cardinals, as representatives of the church of Rome, also
represent the universal church. Gerson clearly states that a general council cannot be
identified with the gathering of a local church but must truly represent all of the
churches.
The council of the church which the pope . . . is bound to use is truly a
council of the churches of the universal church, both the church of Rome and
the church of Paris and every single true [church] of Christ.'
The church that cannot err is not a local congregation but the universal church, and it
is this church that must be gathered in council.
So far Gerson seems to be in agreement with the conciliar theory of William
of Ockham. He, too, had argued the infallible church could be identified with the

43"

tenetur papa uti consili Ecclesiae et episcoporum" DAC 5.3.

'"Ecclesiae consilium quo papa . . . tenetur uti, est universalis Ecclesiae et ecclesiae
Romanae et ecclesiae Parisiensis et omnium singularium Christi vere ecclesiarum
consilium." DAC 5.4.
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church of Rome only when that term was used in the sense of the universal church.'
However, Gerson parts ways with Ockham and other radical conciliarists in his
definition of the universal church. For Ockham the universal church that cannot err
was made up of all faithful catholics, and thus could not be represented adequately by
a general council.' Gerson, on the other hand, identifies the church that cannot err
with the assembly of all Christian bishops.
It must be believed with certain faith that the college of all Christian bishops is
not able to err in faith or to be defiled by schism.'
The inerrancy of the universal church is to be found in the episcopal college, not with
the mass of simple believers.
That multitude which is not able to err is not merely the multitude of the
faithful including men and women, children and adults."
For this reason the universal church can be represented adequately in council by its
hierarchy.
Another argument in asserting the authority of the general council is Gerson's
definition of the schism as a matter over which a council can exercise jurisdiction.
Gerson carefully states that a council is inerrant when dealing with "truths of the faith

'Brian Tierney, "Ockham, the Conciliar Theory, and the Canonists" Journal of the
History of Ideas 15 (1954): 66.
"Hendrix, "In Quest of the Vera Ecclesia," 361.
'"Collegium omnium episcoporum christianorum non posse errare in tide et
schismate maculari, est certa fide credendum." DAC 3.5.
""Illa multitudo quae non potest errare, non est tantum multitudo fidelium
complectans viros et mulieres, parvulos et adultos." DAC 3.6.
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or things necessary or useful for the rule of the church (emphasis mine)."' Thus
even if opponents argue the schism is not a matter of faith, the split could still be
dealt with as a matter concerning the orderly government of Christendom. The
schism comes under the council's jurisdiction because the matter concerns the whole
church. Gerson argues the Christian church is able "to gather legitimately and
canonically and to summon them [i.e. the two popes] concerning a matter of faith or a
condition touching the universal church."" Here he appeals to a maxim common in
canon law: "What touches all must be approved by all."' Since the schism certainly
is "a condition touching the universal church," it must be settled by the whole church,
which is, of course, best represented by a general council.
In order to settle the schism, the general council must have the authority to
judge over the rival popes. However, Gerson's regard for the office of the papacy
makes it impossible for him to assert that a general council is superior to the pope in
every respect. He appeals rather to the unique situation of the schism and the specific
areas of authority exercised by the universal church gathered in council.

49"veritates

fidei aut necessarias vel utiles pro regimine Ecclesiae." DAC 5.1.

50"legitime et canonice congregare et eos citare super materiam fidei aut tangentem
universalis Ecclesiae statum" DAC 10.3.3.
51 "Quod omnes tangit ab omnibus approbetur." This principle is common in
conciliarist literature and appears in several variations. See Bliemetzrieder, 37.
According to Walter Ullman, this was "a stock phrase and a fundamental tenet in canon
law and canonistic doctrine" and was "transformed into a constitutional principle in
medieval England." Medieval Papalism: The Political Theories of the Medieval
Canonists (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1949), 21-22, David Peterson identifies the
phrase as a "Roman law maxim." "Conciliarism, Republicanism and Corporatism: the
1415-1420 Constitution of the Florentine Clergy" Renaissance Quarterly 42 (1989):197.
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The entire schism really hinged on the matter of the papal election. If Urban
VI had been properly elected, then the Roman pope was the true vicar of Christ. If,
however, that election was invalid, as the French cardinals claimed, it could be
argued that Benedict XIII was the true pope. Gerson begins to address this situation
in the second article of De auctoritate.
Just as the papal office is in the world by statute of Christ, so the way of
obtaining it canonically through the election of the church is by orderly
arrangement of Christ.52
Gerson admits this "orderly arrangement of Christ" was the election of the pope by
the cardinals.53 However, in referring to the "election of the church" he seems to
indicate that in choosing the pope, the cardinals serve as representatives of the whole
church. Since the schism had come about because the cardinals had failed to agree in
their choice of pope, Gerson argues that the matter can be taken up by a more faithful
representation of the whole church, that is, a general council.' Furthermore, the
lack of clarity and order in the papal elections results in the subordination of the rival
popes to the general council. "A pope elected in contention . . . is subordinate to the
universal church or the college representing it."55

"Sicut papale officium est in orbe ex Christi statuto, ita modus ipsum canonice
obtinendi per electionem Ecclesiae est ex Christi ordinatione." DAC 2.
52

DAC 6.5.

53

'DAC 6.5.
'Papa in contentione electus . . . est subordinatus Ecclesiae universali aut collegio
earn repraesentanti." DAC 6.8.
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Since neither pope could be trusted to judge the schism impartially, Gerson
concludes that adherence to the decision of a general council is "the only way for
union of the church."' The problem, as he sees it, is to assert the authority of a
general council over the papacy in the matter of the schism without permanently
reducing the authority of the papal office. One way he accomplishes this is by
stressing the dubious claim the rival popes have to the papal throne. Gerson
assiduously avoids referring to either Benedict or Gregory as pope. He clearly states
that "it is not the opinion or assertion of the universal church that Benedict is pope,
and the same concerning Gregory."' Since it is impossible for the church to have
two true heads, Gerson refers to Benedict and Gregory as "pretenders" or
"contenders. "5a It is not a difficult matter to assert the authority of a general council
of the church over one who is merely a contender for the papal office.
From the beginning of the present division of the church, the universal church
gathered [in council], as presently in March, has and has had the authority to
summon both contenders and to inquire concerning their true or supposed right
[to the papacy].59
The council has the right not only to summon both Gregory and Benedict to appear
but also to judge whether their rival claims to the papacy are legitimate.

56"

sola via pro unione Ecclesiae" DAC 6.6.

57"Non est opinio vel assertio universalis Ecclesiae quod Benedictus sit papa, et idem
de Gregorio." DAC 6.9
58 nutriusque
59"Ab

praetendentium se habere jus" DAC 11. "Duo contendentes" DAC 11.6.

initio praesentis Ecclesiae divisionis, universalis Ecclesia congregata, ut modo
in martio, habet et habuit auctoritatem citandi utrumque contendentium et inquirendi de
jure eonim vero vel putativo." DAC 11.1.
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Gerson himself recognizes the principal difficulty involved in such a judgment
by the council: could the council exercise such authority over the one who was the
true pope? As Walter Ullmann observes, the canonists described papal power in a
way that placed the pope above judgment.
Resting on the fullness of his power, the pope was to be beyond the reach of
any mortal. The idea of papal responsibility was unanimously rejected. There
was nobody on earth who could say to the pope: "Cur ita facies?" as the
standing phrase in canonistic writings ran.'
Gerson directly answers this objection by observing that the pope is not subject to the
judgment of another mortal but to the determination of the universal church in his
obedience to the decision of a general council.
It is granted that the true vicar of Christ does not have superiors or even one
superior among mortal men. However when he has been summoned by the
catholic church or others in its place, he is bound to appear.'
In the case of the Council of Pisa the cardinals had acted in place of the church
catholic by summoning both popes to appear. Gerson observes, by way of
safeguarding papal authority, that this is done without the cardinals exercising
jurisdiction over the true pope. Instead this right must be granted in the situation of
the schism to examine the claims of those disputing over the papacy.62

'Ullmann, Medieval Papalism, 50.
""Licet verus Christi vicarius inter mortales homines non habeat aliquos vel aliquem
superiorem, citatus tamen per Ecclesiam catholicam aut aliquos vice ejus, tenetur
comparere." DAC 11.3.
'Sine jurisdictione super duos contendentes, saltem super illum ex eis qui est
Christi vicarius, domini cardinales utruiusque partis potuerunt ambos contendentes citare
ad videndum de titulo eorum." DAC 11.8.
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Gerson does not, however, believe either Benedict or Gregory will emerge
from the Council of Pisa with an undisputed claim to the papacy. He recognizes it
will be necessary for both popes to lay aside their claims to the papal throne.° Thus
the council will have to exercise jurisdiction over the one of them who perhaps should
have been recognized as true pope. In order to accommodate this possibility, Gerson
appeals to the canon law on judging a pope who is guilty of heresy. According to the
Decretum, the pope "ought to be judged by no one, unless he is apprehended with
respect to erroneous faith.' Thus Gerson observes that in the case of the schism,
the church has the same power over the papacy as it has when the pope is accused of
heresy.° The heresy of which both contenders are guilty is, of course, "the sin of
schism."'
Gerson further reveals his adherence to canon law in his lengthy discussion of
the way in which such heresy might be exposed and condemned even though the rival
popes "may have claimed intellectually nothing contrary to the faith or different from

°"Duodecimus articulus aperiet modum secundum quem sub poena perdendi jus quod
praetendumt in papatu, tenentur contendentes cedere." DAC 12.
'[Papa] a nemine est judicandus, nisi deprehendatur a fide devius." (Dist. 40 c.
6) Quoted in Tierney, "Ockham, the Conciliar Theory, and the Canonists," 50.

65"Super duobus quorum quolibet est dubium aut non clarum toti Ecclesiae an sit
intrusus, habet Ecclesia modo dicto congregata, tale et tantum posse quale habetur super
haereticum quondam in papatum praesidentem." DAC 11.2.
""Et in deductione hujus conclusionis declaratur quod praesidens in papatu potest
cadere in vitium schismatis." DAC 6.9.
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those things determined by the church."' In order to force Benedict and Gregory to
abandon their claims, both rival popes must be recognized as heretical and the faithful
must be released from their obedience to either. This can be accomplished by
presenting evidence of the popes' heresy, the popes' public confession, or the
declaration of a general council." Gerson follows the canon law here, stating that a
pope could not be accused of an "occult" crime, such as secretly holding heretical
opinions, but could be accused only on the basis of public evidence or his own
admission.' Even though in the present case neither pope had publicly declared
anything heretical, Gerson insists the council will be able to judge based on the
actions of the two rivals.
In a holy and just way a heretic is able to be exposed and condemned in the
public forum of the church on the basis of exterior acts.'
The church gathered in council is able to judge by the actions of the pope whether he
is guilty of the heresy of schism. If he is found guilty, the council can strip him of
papal authority. Although this would seem to give the council unlimited authority

67n

licet per intellectum nihil contra fidem aut aliter contra determinata per
Ecclesiam asseruerint." DAC 13.
. . .

""vel per evidentiam facti vel per publicam ejus confessionem vel indubio per
universalis Ecclesiae legitime congregatae declarationem." DAC 13.2.
'Tierney, "Ockham, the Conciliar Theory, and the Canonists," 53.
'°"Sancte et juste ex actibus exterioribus potest convinci et condemnari in foro
publico Ecclesiae tamquam haereticus." DAC 13.6.
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over the pope, Gerson adds that the deposition of a pope is not based on the authority
of the council itself but on Christ's authority as mediated through the council.'
Gerson anticipates that both contenders for the papacy will be found guilty of
continuing the schism. Upon such a decision of the council, both "will be bound to
practice cession themselves or through substitutes."' Only through cession can
either Benedict or Gregory be absolved of his complicity in the schism.' However,
since Gerson expects the rivals will refuse to recognize the council's decision, he adds
that by refusing, the pope effectively forfeits any right he might have to the
papacy.' Therefore even if one of the contenders continues to insist he is the true
pope, he will not be recognized as such by the church." In any case, the rival
claimants for the papal throne are bound to the decision of the council.
Gerson lays a difficult task at the feet of the general council, but he also points
out that the council has sufficient resources for terminating the schism. He states that
a general council has the authority and ability to interpret both divine and human law.

71 "Ex actibus aut omissionibus exterioribus in multiplici casu judicatur papatus
possessor haereticus per Ecclesiam congregatam vicem talis Ecclesiae gerentem; et tali
judicio mediante privatur a Christo papali auctoritate." DAC 13.7.

72" tenebuntur

cessionem practicare per se vel per substitutos." DAC 12.1.

73"

neuter eorum excusabitur a schismate quidquid obtulerit, dixeret aut fecerit, nisi
actu cesserit per se vel per alium" DAC 12.4.
'"In casu isto non sufficit promptitudo animi ad cedendum, . . ., suo juri vero vel
praetenso tunc et pro tunc actu renuntiare." DAC 12.2.
75"

contendentium alter vel uterque asserens pertinaciter non sic se debere diligere
Ecclesia ut papatus dimittatur" DAC 12.5.
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The arguments he marshals are extremely important in asserting the authority of a
general council.
Gerson deals with this interpretative authority of the council in a single article
of De auctoritate. He argues, first of all, that this authority is essentially the
"authority of the apostolic church in explaining Sacred Scripture."76 Gerson does
not, however, simply equate the authority of the church of his day with the authority
of the ecclesia primitiva. The apostolic church had the power to formulate divine
law, as occurred at the Jerusalem Council." In contrast, Gerson states that a
general council is able neither to introduce new divine obligations nor to set the
former aside.78 The council's interpretative authority is limited because the authority
of the church itself is limited.'
Yet this authority is more than adequate for bringing an end to the schism. In
deciding how this should be done, Gerson looks to Scripture as the highest authority
and to the council as its interpreter.

76n

auctoritatem Ecclesiae apostolicae in explanando Scripturam Sacram" DAC 7.

'Acts 15.
'Per interpretationem Ecclesiae congregatae non cessat aut introducitur nova divina
obligatio." DAC 7.3.
'Pascoe observes that according to Gerson: "The authority of the primitive Church,
therefore, transcends that of pope, council, and even the contemporary Church; none of
whom has the power to formulate divine law because none has an authority equal to that
of the ecclesia primitiva." "Jean Gerson: The 'Ecclesia Primitiva' and Reform."
Traditio 30 (1974):[3—no page numbers given].
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The church gathered from both obediences is thus able to explain and interpret
Sacred Scripture that each of the contenders is bound under [penalty of] eternal
perdition to accept its thought in respect to ways of uniting the church.'
Gerson assumes there will be little argument over the authority of Scripture, but the
authority of the council to interpret it over and against the contenders for the papal
throne is another matter. For this reason, Gerson devotes most of his argument to
providing for the acceptance of the council's interpretation.
The two principal obstacles Gerson anticipated were the interference of the
rival popes and questions concerning the interpretation of law. He deals with the
former by placing the council above obedience to the pope and with the latter by
appealing to the principle of epikeia.
Gerson recognizes the need to keep either pope from attempting to exercise
coercive authority over the proceedings of the council. To prevent this, he asserts
that while the council sits in session it will bow in obedience to neither of the
contenders. Instead it will rise above obedience." He adds that even if one of the
contenders were the true pope, he has no jurisdiction over the council once the
suspension of obedience has been made." In this way Gerson attempts to protect
the decision of the general council from the machinations of the rival popes.
""Ecclesia congregata ex ambabus obedientiis potest Scripturam Sacram exponere
et interpretare sic quod ejus sensum circa modos uniendi Ecclesiam tenetur sub aeterna
perditione uterque contendentium acceptare." DAC 7.1.
'Ecclesia congregata durante, non esse obediendum alicui ex duobus
contendentibus; supersedendum est ab odedientia." DAC 7.5.
"Facta ex concilio universalis Ecclesiae congregatae supsensione obedientiae
respectu duorum contendentium, si illorum verus papa utatur officio, nihil operabitur in
hiis quae sunt jurisdictionis." DAC 7.6.

41
For Gerson a potentially more dangerous obstacle to the council's success is its
own inability to agree on the interpretation of law. He recognizes the entire matter of
the schism and the convocation of a general council is governed by a multitude of
laws that more often than not seem to contradict each other. However, since his
objective is to bring a swift end to the schism, he writes that the council will look to
the spirit of these laws rather than endure endless haggling concerning their letter in
making its decision. It is very likely that the council will find "the discussion of a
part of law impossible, difficult, or useless."' In such a case, the statement of the
Christian church itself, that is, the decision of the general council, will stand as law.
Gerson does not intend that either divine or human law should simply be set aside.
Rather he expects the council will be able to discern the intent behind any dubious
points of law and render an appropriate decision." This is, as James Connolly has
observed, "the real argument on which Gerson would rely" for the council's
termination of the schism."
In this argument Gerson appeals to the principle of epikeia, the equitable
interpretation of the law. The principle of epikeia was a commonplace in conciliar
writings. Conrad of Gelnhausen, for example, described it as the abandoning of the

""Si judicante Ecclesia universali congregata impossibilis, difficilis aut inutilis sit
discussio juris partium . . ." DAC 7 .7 .
'Christiana Ecclesia erit solers, justus et acutus epyekes cujus dicto standum erit."
DAC7.7.
"Connolly, 81.
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letter of the law in favor of the use of reason." The concept originated with
Aristotle, who described it in his Nicomachean Ethics.
When the law speaks universally, then, and a case arises on it which is not
covered by the universal statement, then it is right, where the legislator fails us
and has erred by over-simplicity, to correct the omission—to say what the
legislator himself would have said had he been present, and would have put
into his law if he had known."
Following Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas spoke of epikeia as a virtue that protects natural
law, which has its origins with God, from the imperfections of human, or positive,
law.88 The idea that the intention of the legislator must be considered in interpreting
law was extremely useful to the conciliarists, since those who had codified the canon
law obviously had not intended their statements of papal supremacy to be taken as an
apology for continuing schism. In fact, the principle of epikeia can be found in the
canon law itself. According to Brian Tierney, conciliarists could use the Decretales
of Gregory IX, the writings of Hostiensis, and the Glossa Ordinaria of Gratian's
Decretum to support the principle of "equity.' For Gerson, applying the principle
of epikeia will ensure the justice, and thus the acceptance, of the council's decisions.

86Bliemetzrieder, 70. Morrall cautions: "It would be rash to over-estimate Conrad's
influence on Gerson. The Provost's work was widely known to all the academic
'Conciliar' circles, and the arguments of the Epistola Concordiae, radical as they may
have seemed in 1381, were tending to become commonplace in the later stages of the
Schism." 122.

Nicomachean Ethics, The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon (New
York: Random House, 1941), 1020.
8.- i

"New Catholic Encyclopedia, s. v. "epikeia."
'Tierney, "Ockham, the Conciliar Theory, and the Canonists," 44.
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Conclusion
The doctrine of the church that emerges from De auctoritate is both
hierarchical and practical. In this treatise Gerson appears both as a doctor of the
church who defends traditional doctrine, and as a practical theologian who interprets
that doctrine in a way that reveals his sensitivity to the exigencies of the church of his
day. Thus Gerson asserts the authority of the ecclesiastical hierarchy, including that
of the papacy, while defending the convocation of the Council of Pisa and describing
its authority in the matter of the schism. The development and implications of
Gerson's conciliar theory are of tremendous importance for interpreting the entire
conciliar movement. As will be demonstrated, the solution Gerson proposed in De
auctoritate represents what would become the majority opinion of those gathered at
Constance and exerted a tremendous influence on conciliar thought up to the time of
the Council of Trent.

CHAPTER 3
DE AUCTORITATE CONCILII IN CONTEXT

In De auctoritate concilii, and in his other conciliar treatises, Gerson served as
an eloquent spokesman for a moderate approach to conciliar theory. The essentially
conservative nature of his conciliar ecclesiology is revealed when placed in the
context of his own theological development and in the context of the conciliar
movement as a whole. Gerson emerges from the conciliar debate as a more or less
archetypal ecclesiastic whose desire for reform was tempered by a high regard for
existing institutions. Such men no doubt filled the vast majority of offices in the
church of Gerson's day, and for this reason his conception of the church and authority
has much to say about the temporary success and ultimate failure of the conciliar
movement.

De Auctoritate Concilii and the Development of
Gerson's Conciliar Theory
In De auctoritate concilii Gerson appeals to scripture as the ultimate authority
in the church. However, the more significant question concerns the authority to
interpret both scripture and positive law. Gerson's answer to this question places
authority in the church firmly in the hands of the hierarchy as the sine qua non of the
church. The principal members of this hierarchy are the bishops who are collectively
inerrant in matters of faith. Their authority can be expressed either by the supreme
44
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bishop, the pope, or by a general council, roughly equivalent to an assembly of
bishops. Between these two, pope and council, there is a balance of power; each
wields authority differently in the church. At the time of the schism, the council
seems to have the upper hand since it can judge the pope. However, the continuing
relationship between pope and council is only hinted at in De auctoritate. Gerson's
position in this matter becomes clearer when the development of his ecclesiology is
considered.
Throughout his life Gerson remained committed to the papacy as a divine
institution. He did not advocate a conciliar solution to the schism until 1408. For
this reason, many scholars view Gerson's conciliarism as an inconsistent and
somewhat unfortunate development in his theology. According to John Morrall,
Gerson's defense of conciliar authority "was radical and hardly reconcilable with
tradition" and a position "from which he would have recoiled twenty years before."'
James Connolly states, "Had [Gerson] suspected for a moment the fruit which the
idea of Conciliar Supremacy would bear, he would have been the first to condemn
it."' Gerson biographer Anne Masson takes an even more extreme position in her
attempt to absolve Gerson of any guilt as the "patriarch of gallican liberties."' She
views Gerson's conciliar writings as erroneous but excusable in light of the
'John B. Morrall, Gerson and the Great Schism (Manchester: The University Press,
1960), 110.
'James L. Connolly, John Gerson: Reformer and Mystic (St. Louis: B. Herder Book
Co., 1928), 69-70.
Anne L. Masson, Jean Gerson, sa vie, son temps, ses oeuvres (Lyons: E.Vitte,
1894), 280.
3
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circumstances.4 Gerson's ideas about a solution to the schism did, of course,
develop over time. However, this development did not include a radical shift in his
fundamental ecclesiology. Gerson's earlier ecclesiological writings reveal little that
would exclude the ideas expressed in his treatises from the time of Pisa and
Constance.
Before 1408 Gerson had advocated the via cessionis as the best way to
terminate the schism. He defended this position in his 1392 treatise Pro unione
Ecclesiae.5 Here he called on the pope to do his duty as the "universal intercessor
for the people" and to act as he is obligated by his universal office.6 Gerson also
presented the convocation of a general council as one of "many reasonable and honest
ways" of terminating the schism.' Among the arguments marshalled in defense of
the council were its inerrancy and the desirability of involving many members of the
ecclesiastical hierarchy. The difficulty Gerson saw in convoking a general council
was entirely practical: he was afraid it would cause a scandal and further divide the
church.' Gerson states this even more forcefully in his De papatu contendtibus of
1396: "If [a general council] is not convened collegially it is nothing."9 Gerson was

4Ibid.,

282.

5Jean

Gerson, Oeuvres Completes, ed. by P. Glorieux (Paris: Desclee & Cie., 19601973), 6:1-21.
6G

6:6.

7G

6:10.

'Sine dubio istud reunire in multis causat scandalum . . ." Ibid.
9s .

. .

si [concilium generale] non fieret collegialiter nihil esset." G 6:28.
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reluctant to advocate the via concilii because he could not imagine a council that
would embrace both obediences. Without broad-based support a general council
could not possibly succeed in ending the schism. For Gerson the success of the
council had to be assured before it was convened. He concluded in a treatise of
1402, De schismate, that a council gathered in haste would only further damage the
church and could jeopardize the effectiveness of future councils.' This practical
consideration lay at the heart of much of Gerson's opposition to the calling of a
general council.
The one obstacle of a theological nature was the question of papal
convocation. In Pro unione Ecclesiae Gerson assumed a council would be called by
the pope. In the later De schismate he explicitly stated a council could be summoned
only by the pope." Although Gerson continued to assert that a general council was
normally the pope's to convene, he argued for other means of convocation in De
auctoritate concilii.' In the matter of papal convocation, Gerson did alter his views
to fit the circumstances. The reason for this was, of course, necessity. Gerson
applied the principle of epikeia for himself and concluded that the church should not
be deprived of the benefit of a general council simply because the pope refused to

'Si vero nihil sententietur, irrisorium et vanum erit concilium. Si aliquid
sententietur quod non teneatur, erit perniciosum et scandalosissimum pro omnibus
conciliis in posterum celebrandis, et erit schismatum innumerabilium et irreparabilium
causativum." G 6:48-49.
n"Concilium autem generale non potest convocari in forma juris nisi auctoritate
summi pontificis, dist. 17a, cum ibidem allegatis." G 6:45.
'De Auctoritate Concilii 3.1. See p. 25 above.
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summon one. Gerson was brought to this view by his growing disillusionment with
the rival popes as they refused time and again to withdraw their claims for the good
of the church. Gerson expressed his disillusionment as early as 1406-1407 in his
Disputatio de schismate tollendo. In this treatise he observed if everyone would seek
to do what is pleasing to Christ rather than pleasing to himself, it would be easy to
end the schism.' The same sentiment can be seen in the sermon Veniat Pax of 4
November 1408 in which Gerson denounced both popes." Gerson's disillusionment
coupled with the possibility of a general council that would embrace both obediences
led him to abandon the via cessionis for the via concilii in 1408.
By the time of the Council of Pisa, Gerson's writings reflect a conciliar
ecclesiology and view of authority. Beside De auctoritate concilii, Gerson wrote
three other major treatises between November 1408 and March 1409: Ad
defendendum concilii Pisani convocationem memorandum, his Propositio facia coram
Anglicis, and Tractatus de unitate Ecclesiae. I5 The themes Gerson developed in De
auctoritate run through every one of these treatises.' All contain essentially the
same thoughts on terminating the schism through a general council. This similarity

"Propter ista notandum occurrit quod si quilibet de Ecclesia parvus et magnus,
quaereret quae sunt Jesus Christi plus quam sua, facilis haberetur exitus ad schisma
terminandum. " G 6:100.
13

"Morrall, 76.
'The titles are those given in G 6.
"For a discussion of the contents of these treatises see Morrall, 76-93, and G. H.
M. Posthumus Meyjes, Jean Gerson; Zijn Kerkpolitiek en Ecclesiologie (S'Gravenhage:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1963), 131-55.
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leads to the inevitable conclusion that Gerson's conciliarism was not a whim. Rather
it resulted from a well-reasoned shift in his thinking with regard to a practical solution
to the schism. Gerson did not abandon traditional ecclesiology and maintained his
high regard for the ecclesiastical hierarchy and for the office of the papacy. He did,
however, find room in this tradition for the authority of a general council convened
without papal consent.
Although the Pisan treatises confirm Gerson's conciliarism, they contribute
little to the understanding of the precise relationship between pope and council in his
ecclesiology. For this we must turn to Gerson's writings from the time of the
Council of Constance, especially his Tractatus de potestate ecclesiastica. This
treatise, delivered at the Constance on 6 February 1417, further refines and defines
the general outlines of Gerson's ecclesiology as presented in De auctoritate concilii.
Gerson treats many of the same themes in both treatises such as the divine institution
of the ecclesiastical hierarchy," the nature of the corpus Christi mysticum,' and
the use of epikeia." Nevertheless, the arguments marshalled in De potestata
ecclesiastica are different from those of De auctoritate concilii. While in 1409
Gerson had been fighting for the recognition of the council's authority, writing in
1417 he had only to make reference to the decree Haec Sancta which had already

17

G 6:226.
G 6:212.
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"G 6:230.
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asserted the authority of a general council." In De potestata ecclesiastica Gerson is
concerned primarily with the nature of ecclesiastical authority and the way it is used
within the church, that is, in the relationship between pope and council.
The first article of De potestate ecclesiastica neatly summarizes Gerson's view
of authority in the church.
Ecclesiastical power is power which has been conferred by Christ
supernaturally and specially upon his apostles and disciples and their legitimate
successors until the end of time for the edification of the church militant
according to the evangelical laws for the goal of eternal felicity.'
The practical question that remains to be answered is how and by whom this power is
exercised among the legitimate successors of the apostles and disciples, and especially
between the papacy and a general council. Gerson naturally argues for the authority
of the general council. He does not, however, view this as an authority over and
against the papacy. Rather he envisions a cooperative exercise of authority between
pope and council. The council is to advise the pope just as Jethro advised Moses, and
the pope is to give the same attention to the council's advice that Moses had given to
that of his father-in-law.' The general council's power, however, goes far beyond

"G 6:217.
21 "Potestas

ecclesiastica est potestas quae a Christo supernaturaliter et specialiter
collata est suis apostolis et discipulis ac eorum successoribus legitimis usque in finem
saeculi ad aedificationem Ecclesiae militantis secundum leges evangelicas pro
consecutione felicitatis aeternae." G 6:211.
n"Specialiter

quod si Moyses loquens Deo familiariter sicut amicus ad amicum
obedienter audivit consilium gentilis hominis in regimine totius Synagogae, quanto magis
debet hod Summus Pontifex ad dictamen totius Ecclesiae vel generalis concilii suo
nomine." G 6:224.
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that of an advisory body. The general council is able to judge the pope."
Therefore, although Gerson admits the papal plenitude of power "formally and
subjectively," he does not define that plenitude as an exclusive or ultimate authority in
the church. To say the pope has a plenitude of power merely recognizes his ex officio
exercise of a worldwide power of jurisdiction. A plenitude of power was ascribed to
the pope to differentiate his power of jurisdiction from that of an ordinary bishop.'
It is the general council, as representative of the whole church, that holds a true
plenitude of power."
However, Gerson also maintains the place of the papacy in the ecclesiastical
hierarchy. The church cannot be ruled on a permanent basis without the pope, and
although the office of the papacy might be vacated for a time, the church must not let
that continue." The papacy is necessary, especially for the day-to-day operation of
the church as one of the "essential and permanent" parts of the church.' At no

""Declaratum nempe decretumque est quod et sine papa generale concilium
convocari et a concilio papa judicari certis casibus potest." G 6:225.
24"Potestas

ecclesiastica in sua plenitudine est formaliter et subjective in solo Romano
Pontifice. . . . Hic autem consurgit aequivocatio non modica propter dominos juristas qui
loquentes de plenitudine potestatis papalis solum loqui videntur de potestate
jurisdictionis. " G 6:227.
25"Potestas

ecclesiastica in sua plenitudine est in Ecclesia sicut in fine et sicut in
regulante applicationem et usum hujusmodi plenitudinis ecclesiasticae potestatis per
seipsam vel per generale concilium earn sufficienter et legitime repraesentans." G 6:232.
26n . . . sicut apparuit dum vacavit Sedes per duos aut tres annos, sicut et nunc vacat,
nihilominus generale concilium neque deberet neque posset talem defectum capitis usque
in finem saeculi tolerare stante lege." G 6:235.
nG 6:222.
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point does Gerson argue for a broad, general authority of council over pope; a council
is able to judge the pope only "in certain cases."" Gerson has no desire to reject
the legitimate exercise of papal authority and replace it with the tyranny of a council.
Instead he proposes a collegial approach to authority within the church, based on
Aristotle's threefold division of natural rule." Authority in the church is to be
wielded by the papacy, the college of cardinals, and synods or general councils, each
according to its place. Although details of this arrangement are absent from Gerson's
theorizing, obviously he remains optimistic about the future of the church, envisioning
an era of cooperation between pope and council.
Since Gerson never returned to Paris and his post at the University after
Constance, he did not have occasion to address the church at large concerning matters
of ecclesiology after 1418.3° For this reason we are left with what is perhaps an
incomplete account of Gerson's view of church and authority. The gaps in his theory
must remain unfilled, and the significant question of whether he would have moved
beyond the conciliar stand he took at Constance must remain unanswered.

28"

et a concilio papa judicari certis casibus potest" G 6:229.

""Possumus conformiter ad praedictam Philosophi politiam tripliciter distinctam in
naturali regimine, politiam ecclesiasticam dividere, quod alia est papalis, alia est
collegialis, alia synodalis seu concilii generalis." G 6:248.
300n

the shape of Gerson's theology after Constance in general see Mark S. Burrows,
"Jean Gerson after Constance: 'Via Media et Regia' as a Revision of the Ockhamist
Covenant," Church History 59 (1990): 467-81.
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De Auctoritate Concilii and Gerson's Theology
The ecclesiology in De auctoritate concilii was by no means incompatible with
the rest of Gerson's theology. His view of church and authority directly resulted
from his unique blending of nominalism and mysticism. The nominalism that
pervaded Gerson's theology becomes apparent when his statements in key areas are
compared with the views of Ockham and his successors. When Gerson departs
significantly from the nominalist opinion, it is often the result of his mystical thought.
Gerson's doctrine of the church and the place he assigned it in the economy of
salvation was undoubtedly influenced by his nominalist education. This can be seen,
first of all, in the use he makes of the phrase stante lege when describing the church.
In De auctoritate, Gerson defines the nature of the college of bishops "as the
Christian law stands" and "by the law of Christ."' He also states that the church or
the council representing it cannot err "as the law of Christ stands."32 Gerson points
out that these definitions of the church hold true only for the order which is now in
place. He is describing the church de potentia Dei ordinata, to use the more common

31 "Stante christiana lege, universitas episcoporum est inobliquabilis secundum
affectum et intellectum, nec est compossibile Christi lege eos omnes collective desinere
per mortem aut haereticare." DAC 3.4.

"Non est possibile, stante lege Christi, concilium generale aut universalem
Ecclesiam congregetam debite in determinando veritates fidei aut necessarias vel utiles
pro regimine Ecclesiae errare." DAC 5.1.
32
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nominalist phrase." In reference to Gerson's use of stante lege in De potestate
ecclesiastica, Morrall describes it as "a significantly Ockhamist insertion."'
Another example of Ockhamist influence in Gerson's ecclesiology is his appeal
to scripture as the highest authority in the church. Although Ockham's understanding
did not approach the sola scriptura principle that was to emerge from the Protestant
Reformation, the authority of scripture retained a significant place in nominalist
theology." According to John Kilcullen, for Ockham the Bible was one of several
potential sources of doctrine.
The Bible is both rule of faith and source of Catholic truth, but not the only
source: there are also apostolic traditions and post-apostolic revelation. The
teaching of the whole church is not itself a source, but a guarantee that a
doctrine comes from one of the sources even if its derivation cannot be
shown."
Ockham allows the possibility of an on-going process of revelation apart from
scripture. New divine truths could be entrusted to anyone at any time.'
Nevertheless, the Bible emerges from his theology as a superior source of revelation;
the Gospels are of greater authority than the pronouncements of the pope and canon

Heiko A. Oberman, The Harvest of Medieval Theology: Gabriel Biel and Late
Medieval Nominalism (Grand Rapids: William P. Eerdmanns, 1967), 100.
33

34

Morrall, 107.

35John J. Ryan, The Nature, Structure and Function of the Church in William of
Ockham (Missoula, Montana: Scholars Press, 1979), 43. See also Oberman, Harvest,
361-93.

'John Kilcullen, "Ockham and Infallibility," The Journal of Religious History 16
(1991): 393.
'Ryan, 45.
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law.38 While the latter may also be catholic truth, their veracity must be tested by
the acceptance of the whole church. Only in the pages of scripture can one be certain
of finding undisputable truth. Ockham wrote, "Concerning many questions of faith
those learned in sacred letters can be certain of Catholic truth, notwithstanding the
question of doubt of anyone else whomsoever."" John Ryan points out that in
Ockham's writings "nothing else taken by itself—neither the universal doctrine nor the
Apostles—is ever called the 'rule of faith,' as scripture is."' There can be no doubt
that for Ockham scripture stands above the other sources of doctrine.
Gerson's view of scripture is strikingly similar to Ockham's. Like Ockham,
Gerson admits other sources of revelation,'" although scripture remains the
preeminent one. The high esteem in which he held the scripture is clear in his
discussion of the authority of a general council. In De auctoritate concilii, for
example, the general council's authority to interpret scripture is considered and
defended at length. On the other hand, its authority to interpret canon law and papal
decrees is simply assumed, because once the relationship with scripture as the
superior authority is established, the others easily fall into place.' For this same
reason Gerson's writings rarely contain explicit references to canon law, but abound

"Kilcullen, 392.
"Contra Benedictum quoted in Kilcullen, 402.
'Ryan, 45.
1.1e states, for example, that there will always be those in the church whose purpose
is "receiving from God special illustrations for the use of the general church." DAC 9.2.
41

42

DAC 7.
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in references to scripture. This view of scripture no doubt results from his nominalist
training.
The broader outlines of Gerson's ecclesiology also bear the marks of
nominalism. Gerson is more open than Ockham himself to the charge of
ecclesiastical positivism commonly leveled against the nominalists.43 Ockham relied
on the authority of the church to the extent that the unbroken witness of all faithful
Christians bears testimony to the truth of catholic doctrine.' For Ockham since the
church was made up of individual believers, its authority could not be distilled into a
single source whether individual, such as the pope, or corporate, such as a general
council. However, as Reinhold Seeberg points out, Ockham's successors
accommodated traditional institutions more than the Venerable Inceptor himself.45
Thus Gerson follows Ockham, but only to a point. Scripture is authoritative, and its
proper interpretation is guaranteed by the church. However, Gerson does not hesitate
to identify the whole church with representatives of its hierarchy gathered in council.

430n

ecclesiastical positivism see Oberman, Harvest, 361-63.

'"[Ockham] appeals, we might almost say, to the Universal Church in time as
against the Universal Church in space; the historical and unbroken witness of faithful
prelates and laity to certain doctrines is itself an infallible guarantee of the truth of these
doctrines." John B. Morrall, "Ockham and Ecclesiology" in Medieval Studies, Presented
to Aubrey Gwynn, S. J., ed. J. A. Watt, J. B. Morrall, F. X. Martin, (Dublin: Co1m
0 Lochlainn, 1961), 488.
43"Starker

noch als Ockam selbst haben sich manche Anhanger seines Nominalismus
in ihrer Theologie wieder den Alteren Anschauungen zugewandt." Reinhold Seeberg,
Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte, Dritter Band: Die Dogmengeschichte des Mittelalters,
4th ed., (Leipzig: A. Diechertsche Verlagsbuchhandlung D. Werner Scholl, 1930), 728.
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Neither does he shrink from the statement, as did Ockham," that the council is
incapable of error, even though it does not have the same authority as the councils of
the early church apparently had. Whatever authority scripture alone might have, its
practical application to the life of the church is mediated by ecclesiastical institutions.
Although much of Gerson's doctrine of the church conforms to nominalist
theology, it also transcends the limitations inherent in the nominalist tradition. For
Gerson the most important truth about the church is that it is the mystical body of
Christ. The church on earth conforms in a real way to the heavenly model." As
Morrall points out, this view of the church "could hardly exist logically in harmony
with the Ockhamist denial of universals and emphasis on the individual as the true
unit of reality."" Although Ockham occasionally referred to the church as the
corpus mysticum, this was undoubtedly the result of conventional use, and the term
had no real significance for his ecclesiology.49 Similarly d'Ailly used the term
infrequently, especially compared to Gerson.5° For Gerson, however, the idea of
the corpus Christi mysticum is the foundation for everything that can be said about the

""It is astonishing that it should ever have been imagined that Ockham was a sponsor
of belief in the supremacy and infallibility of a General Council." Morrall, "Ockham
and Ecclesiology," 481.
47Thus

in De potestate ecclesiastica Gerson refers to the heavenly model for the
tabernacle (Ex. 27:8) and to John's vision of the heavenly city (Rev. 21:2) in support of
the divine institution of the church. G 6:227-28.
"Morrall, Gerson and the Great Schism, 119.
'Ryan, 33.
"Morrall, 119.

58
church. Thus in this important aspect Gerson followed his mystical inclinations and
broke with his nominalist training. For him the church exists not only under the
umbrella of the potentia Dei ordinata, but by a real conformity to the heavenly type it
breaks through to the realm of the potentia Dei absoluta. The result of this can be
seen in his conciliar theory. Because the council in a very real way is the church on
earth, it is also, in a sense, the church in heaven and speaks with a vast and farreaching authority. Thus Gerson is able to assert without hesistation the infallibility
of the general council and its authority to interpret scripture.
What Gerson is not able to say about the church also stems from his mystical
leanings. The relationship between the pope and council remains ambiguous in
Gerson's ecclesiology. This is not so much the result, as Morrall asserts, of theory
following practice,' as it is the result of his emphasis on the corpus Christi
mysticum. For Gerson it is obvious from scripture that Christ's institution of the
church included the offices of pope and bishop that were to remain until the end of
time. However, he could not always explain precisely how these offices functioned
together. It was enough for him to assert that they did work together for the good of
the church. He envisioned the church not as a legislated constitutional monarchy but
as a harmoniously functioning organic whole.
This compromise in Gerson's theology between nominalism and mysticism led
to a compromise in his conciliar theory between the papacy and the council. He
could not follow the realists in viewing the pope as representative of the whole

"Ibid., 122.
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church, but neither could he follow Ockham in rejecting any true representation by a
corporate body. Even with its ambiguities Gerson's conciliar theory is consistent with
other aspects of his theology.

De Auctoritate Concilii and Fifteenth Century Conciliarism
Gerson's ecclesiology, despite some unique features resulting from his
mysticism, represented a moderate conciliar viewpoint. Gerson no doubt spoke for
the vast majority of those who supported the conciliar movement—essentially
conservative churchmen who were willing to look to a council to settle the schism but
unwilling to grant it any far-reaching authority over the papacy. The moderate
approach of the majority of conciliarists is a significant factor in explaining the
temporary success of conciliarism at Constance and its ultimate defeat at Basel. For
this reason Gerson's ecclesiology is an important key to unlocking the history of
conciliarism in the fifteenth century.
By all accounts the Council of Constance was, at least temporarily, an
overwhelming success. The Council declared its authority over the papacy in the
decree Haec Sancta, which John Figgis has called "probably the most revolutionary
official document in the history of the world."" The three rival popes were
deposed, and the new pontiff, Martin V, was pledged to a program of reform. The
decree Frequens assured that future general councils would be held. The success the
Council enjoyed reveals how widespread and accepted the basic ideas of conciliarism

"John Neville Figgis, From Gerson to Grotius 1414-1625 (Cambridge: University
Press, 1907), 35.
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had become in the church.53 However, it also reveals that the actions taken at
Constance were perhaps not as radical as is often imagined. The conciliar theory that
prevailed at Constance was essentially that espoused by Gerson. The existence of the
papacy was not threatened by the decrees of Constance. The pope himself, however,
was subjected to the general council and could be removed from office by its
decision. To the council fathers this was obviously necessary since the pope (or
popes!) had been contributing to the destruction of the church rather than its
edification. The conciliarism espoused at Constance proposed a shift in the balance of
powers that already existed within the church. It by no means advocated a radical
restructuring of the church itself.'
Nowhere is this more apparent than in the council's condemnation of Jan Hus.
The statements attributed to Hus condemned by the council were essentially attacks on
the authority of the ecclesiastical hierarchy. Hus rejected the divine institution of the
papacy and stated that its authority was the work of the emperor.55 He made the

Francis Oakley, The Western Church in the Later Middle Ages (Ithaca and London:
Cornell University Press, 1979), 224.
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"This summary of conciliar theory at Constance is based on Paul De Vooght, "Le
Conciliarisme aux conciles de Constance et de Bale" in Le Concile et les conciles:
Contribution a l'histoire de la vie conciliaire de l'eglise (Editions de Chevetogne,
Editions du Cerf, 1960), 144-146.
7. Petrus non fuit, nec est caput ecclesiae sanctae catholicae." "9. Papalis dignitas
a Caesare inolevit, & Papae praefectio & institutio a Caesaris potentia emanavit."
Sacrorum Conciliorum nova et amplissima collectio, ed. Giovanni Domenico Mansi, 53
vols. (Paris: Hubert, 1901-1927) 27:754.
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authority of any officeholder dependent on his moral state,56 and he declared
ecclesiastical obedience to be the invention of the priests and not something required
by scripture.57 Naturally Gerson was among the most ardent opponents of Hus.
Already in September 1414, he had urged the archbishop of Prague "that against this
error every dominion ought to arise, both spiritual and temporal, to drive out more
completely this very meddlesome reasoning by fire and sword."58 Gerson identified
Hus's heresy with the anti-clericalism of the Waldensians and Beghards, an "error in
faith and morals long ago and very much condemned."59 Gerson's attitude toward
Hus revealed his inherent conservatism. For Gerson the authority of the priesthood
was the very foundation of the church; the laity remained ecclesia audiens.' As the
condemnation of Hus demonstrates, Gerson's conservative view of the nature and
structure of the church was shared by the majority of conciliarists gathered at
Constance.

5'13. Papa non est manifestus & verus successor principis Apostolorum Petri, si
vivit moribus contrariis Petro: si quaerit avaritiam, tunc est vicarius Jude Scariothis. Et
pan evidentia Cardinales non sunt manifesti & veri successores collegii aliorum
Apostolorum Christi, nisi vixerint more Apostolorum, servantes consiliar & mandata
Domini nostri Jesu Christi." Ibid. "30. Nullus est dominis civilis, nullus est praelatus,
nullus est episcopus, dum est in peccato mortali." Ibid., 755.
57"15. Obedientia ecclesiastica est obedientia secundum adinventionem sacerdotum
ecclesiae, praeter expressam auctoritatem scripturae." Ibid., 754.
58gr

. . . quod contra hunc errorem exsurgere deberet omnis dominatio, tam spiritualis
quam temporalis, ad exterminationem magis igne et gladio quam curiosa ratiocinatione."
G 2:162.
59"Error

in fide et moribus pridem et pluries condemnatus . . ." G 2:163.

60D. Catherine Brown, Pastor and Laity in the Theology of Jean Gerson (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1987), 39.
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The pope elected at Constance, Martin V, proved to be no friend of
conciliarism. At his insistence Frequens was altered to forbid any appeal from the
pope to a future council. Gerson recognized the danger in this prohibition and
authored several opinions against it.61 Martin also felt free to ignore other
provisions of Frequens. After being forced to assemble a council at Pavia in 1423, he
never appeared and instead transferred the council to Siena before quickly dissolving
the Pavia proceedings.' The future council announced for Siena was, in fact, duly
convoked by Martin at Basel in 1431 and confirmed after his death by his successor,
Eugenius IV. Eugenius, who was no more well-disposed toward conciliarism than
Martin had been, quickly incurred the wrath of the council fathers by his attempt to
dissolve the assembly, ostensibly because of sparse attendance and the prospect of
union with the Greek church.' When the council refused to disperse, instead
adopting a strict interpretation of Haec Sancta, it won widespread support. Many of
the cardinals, including the council president, Giuliano Cesarini, sided with the
council." Almost two years later, Eugenius capitulated and recognized the council.
However, at about this time sympathy for Eugenius began to build in response to the

61Hans-Jiirgen Becker, Die Appelation vom Papst an ein allgemeines Konzil:
Historische Entwicklung und kanonistische Diskussion im speiten Mittelalter und in der
fruhen Neuzeit (KOln, Wien: Bohlau Verlag, 1988), 128. Th. Kolde, Luthers Stellung
zu Concil und Kirche bis zum Wormser Reichstag, 1521 (Erlangen: Junge, 1900), 3.

'Oaldey, The Western Church in the Later Middle Ages, 226.
'New Catholic Encyclopedia, s. v. "Basel, Council of."
"Joseph Gill, Eugenius IV: Pope of Christian Union (Westminster, Maryland:
Newman Press, 1961), 45.
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council's occupation of large portions of papal territory and the limitations it had
placed on papal income. In 1437 a minority party, including a number of senior
members, defected from Basel. They were welcomed by Eugenius who declared the
council transferred from Basel to Ferrara on the strength of their presence. This
defection led to the triumph of a more radical element at Basel as new recruits, who
tended to be young activists, played a greater role.65 However, the loss of the
conservative element was the beginning of the end for the council. Cardinal Cesarini,
an ardent reformer despite his status as papal legate, went over to Eugenius in
1438." In 1439 the Basel council elected an anti-pope, Felix V, but failed to gain
ground against Eugenius. After much negotiation the council finally dissolved itself
in 1449.
Typical of the conservative element at Basel was Nicholas of Cusa. His
treatise De Concordantia Catholica was presented to the council on 7 November 1433
and was favorably received.' This work, called "the most famous work of the
epoch on the theory of church and state,"" describes the place of church,
ecclesiastical hierarchy, and empire within the order of the universe. The
ecclesiology presented in De Concordantia Catholica stands firmly in the mainstream

"Antony Black, "The Universities and the Council of Basle: Ecclesiology and
Tactics" Annuarium Historiae Conciliorum 6 (1974):345.
"Oakley, The Western Church in the Later Middle Ages, 228.
'Henry Bett, Nicholas of Cusa (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1932), 20.
"Johannes Helmrath, Das Basler Konzil 1431-1449: Forschungstand and Probleme
(Köln: BOhlau Verlag, 1987), 437.
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of conciliar theory,' and as such it has much in common with the work of Gerson.
Like Gerson, Nicholas emphasized the authority of the general council while
maintaining the place of the papacy.7° In support of these ideas, he also relied
heavily on Pseudo-Dionysius, appealing to the hierarchical structure of heaven to
explain the existence and function of the ecclesiastical hierarchy on earth."
Therefore it is not surprising that Nicholas, like Gerson before him, wished to avoid
stripping the papacy of all its power. Beginning in 1436 Nicholas refused to
participate in measures aimed at depriving the papacy of income or authority, and he
was part of the minority group that abandoned the council in 1437.
The alienation of the conservative element by the Council of Basel was the
primary reason for its failure. Antony Black has pointed out that the extreme
conciliar theory adopted at Basel was the work of theologians rather than parish
clergy.' For this reason it did not reflect the thinking of the largest part of the
church in its virulent attacks on the papacy. Paradoxically, the dissemination of the
conciliar decrees depended entirely on the good will of the bishops and archbishops

"Gerd Heinz-Mohr, Nikolaus von Kues and die Konzilsbewegung (Trier: Paulinus
Verlag, 1963), 11.
'°Asserting the authority of the council Nicholas states, ". . . quis dubitat totum
concilium supra papam esse?" De Concordantia Catholica, ed. Gerhard Kahlen, 3 vols.
(Hamberg: Feliz Meiner, 1963), 2:190. However, the pope, like the council, represents
the church, although in a more confused manner: ". . . quia quisque praesidens figurata
generalitate subditos figurat modo, quo papa confusissime totam ecclesiam . . ." Ibid.,
199.
"Book I of De Concordantia Catholica is almost entirely concerned with explaining
this correspondence.
7131ack,

"The Universities and the Council of Basle," 351.
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who were to promulgate them in their local synods." Thus the more radical the
council became, the less its pronouncements were heeded.
This does not mean that there were any fewer committed conciliarists at the
time of Basel than there had been at Constance. The history of the Council of Basel
simply illustrates the essentially conservative nature of the conciliar movement. The
decrees of Basel had gone too far, and the pendulum swung back toward the
papacy.74 The average conciliarist professed a doctrine of the church very similar to
that of Gerson who no doubt would have rejected the extreme decrees of Basel. As
Gerson's ecclesiology demonstrates, papalism and conciliarism are not necessarily
mutually exclusive. Paul De Vooght has observed that many of "the most
distinguished 'Eugenians' professed a papalism more nuanced than the slogan under
which they served ('The pope is above the council')."" Papalists and conciliarists
had much in common. Both viewed the church as essentially hierarchical, disagreeing
only about ultimate authority within the ecclesiastical hierarchy. Both papalists and
conciliarists relied on law. Many of the prominent conciliarists such as Cardinal
Zabarella and Nicholas of Cusa had trained as canon lawyers, and even Gerson

'Helmrath, 343.
'This conservative reaction fits the general pattern of revolution as observed by
Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution, rev. and exp. ed. (New York: Vintage
Books, 1965).
'De Vooght, 175.
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appealed to certain principles of canon law.76 Such men had no wish to foment
revolution within the church or radically to alter existing structures. Instead they
wished to revise and to reform.' For this reason they did not abandon papal
institutions and failed to define adequately the limits of papal authority. The
ambiguity of the relationship between pope and council was the principle reason the
conciliar movement ultimately failed to achieve its goal of reform in head and
members.'

Conclusion
The events of the fifteenth century had a tremendous impact on the course and
shape of events leading to Luther's reformation. The writings of Gerson and the
moderate conciliarism he espoused continued to exert a decisive influence even after
the Council of Basel dissolved. However, the precise nature of this impact is open to
debate. One of the most important questions is the influence of conciliar theory on
'According to Brian Tierney canon law is the principle source of conciliar theory.
See especially his Foundations of the Conciliar Theory. Stanley Chodorow argues that
Gratian's Decretum itself originated within a church reform party. Christian Political
Theory and Church Politics in the Mid-Twelfth Century: The Ecclesiology of Gratian's
Decretum (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972).
"John Connolly accurately captures this distinction. "Whereas Wyclif and, after
him, Hus sought to revolutionize, Gerson sought to revise." 90.
'This is the conclusion reached by Constantin Fasolt in his examination of William
Durant's Tractatus Maior, a conciliar proposal presented to the Council of Vienne. He
states: "Therefore it is meaningless to try and reduce [Durant's] views to systematic
clarity, whether it is in terms of 'papalism' or 'conciliarism' or others that have yet to
be invented. The point is the ambivalence itself. It helps to explain not only Durant's
failure at the Council of Vienne but also the failure of the conciliar movement." Council
and Hierarchy: The Political Thought of William Durant the Younger (Cambridge:
Cambridge University, 1991), 284.
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Luther himself. In an attempt to answer, we shift now to examine Luther's views on
authority in the church.

CHAPTER 4
MARTIN LUTHER: FORMATIVE INFLUENCES
An evaluation of the influences that shaped Martin Luther's thought, although
necessary, is a daunting task. As indicated in the introduction, such an evaluation
involves much debated questions vital to interpreting the Reformation as a whole.
Nevertheless, whatever the argument may be about the impact of Luther's education
on his later theology and the nature of his contact with humanism, there can be no
doubt that his formal education was thoroughly medieval. In fact, Luther's training
was remarkably similar to Gerson's. Both matriculated at universities known for their
adherence to nominalism, and both were influenced by mystical thought. However,
Luther was also steeped in biblical studies and acquainted with humanism. Finally,
conciliarism was by no means a dead issue in Luther's day. Therefore brief
discussion of Luther's acquaintance with nominalism, humanism and mysticism, as
well as an overview of conciliarism on the eve of the Reformation is required before
exploring Luther's statements on the authority of the papacy and general councils.
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Nominalism at Erfurt
It is interesting that Luther declared himself to be a member of the "Ockhamist
faction" as late as 1520.' By the time Luther began his studies at the University of
Erfurt, all of the universities of Europe were, as David Knowles has observed,
"Nominalist of lighter or darker shading."' Erfurt was perhaps colored a darker
shade than most due to the efforts of Jadokus Trutfetter of Eisenach and Bartholomaus
Arnoldi von Usingen. Luther later identified both these nominalist masters as his
teachers.' Nominalist thought had first come to Erfurt through the influence of
Gabriel Biel, professor at Tubingen from 1484-1495 and an advocate of Ockham.4
The influence of this school at Erfurt can be seen in Truttfetter's election as rector of
the philosophy faculty shortly after Luther arrived at the university.' Luther not only

"Sum enim Occanicae factionis . . ." Martin Luther, D. Martin Luthers Werke.
Kritische gesammtausgabe (Weimar: H. Bolau, 1883- ), 6:600. Bengt Hagglund states:
"Dail Luther sich im philosophischer Hinsicht als Occamisten steht, ist mehrfach
bezeugt." Theologie und Philosophie bei Luther und in der Occamistischen Tradition:
Luthers Stellung zur Theorie von der Doppelten Wahrheit (Lund: C. W. K. Gleerup,
1955), 8-9.
'David Knowles, The Evolution of Medieval Thought (New York: Vintage Books,
1962), 330.
'Martin Brecht, Martin Luther: His Road to Reformation 1521-1532, trans. by James
L. Schaaf (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985), 36; E. G. Schwiebert, Luther and His
Times: The Reformation from a New Perspective (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House,
1950), 135-36.
40n Biel's career at Tubingen see Heiko A. Oberman, The Harvest of Medieval
Theology: Gabriel Biel and Late Medieval Nominalism (Grand Rapids: William P.
Eerdmanns, 1967), 16-21.

'Brecht, 37. See also Dietrich Emme, Martin Luthers Weg ins Kloster: Eine
wissenschafiliche Untersuchung in Aufslitzen (Regensburg: Dietrich Emme, 1991).
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studied under Truttfetter and Usingen but apparently had a close personal relationship
with them to the point that Luther's influence led Usingen to join the Erfurt chapter
of the Augustinian Hermits in 1512.6
Even after Luther himself had entered the monastery in 1505, his contact with
nominalism continued. In fact, it has been suggested that the Ockhamism of the
Augustinian Hermits at Erfurt led Luther to choose their order over another.' In the
monastery the influence of Gabriel Biel was felt both in the person of Johann Nathin,
one of Biel's students who was director of the cloister school, and through Biel's most
famous work, the Canonis Misse Expositio! The latter was required reading in
Luther's study for the priesthood and, as such, exerted an important influence on
Luther's early writings. Not surprisingly his 1510 Commentary on the Sentences
showed a marked preference for the works of Biel, as well as those of other
nominalists including Pierre d'Ailly and Ockham himself.9 Luther demonstrated his

'Brecht, 38.
'Ludger Meier, "Research That Has Been Made and Is Yet To Be Made on the
Ockhamism of Martin Luther at Erfurt," Archivum Fransiscanum Historicum 43 (1950),
60.
'Oberman: "Die Bedeutung der Expositio fiir das Studium Luthers ergibt sich von
selbst and ist allgemein belcannt." Gabriel Biel, Canonis Misse Expositio, ed. by Heiko
Oberman and William Courtenay (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1963), xiii. See
also Brecht I, 57, 71.
'Meier, 65.
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acquaintance with these authors later in his Disputation Against Scholastic Theology,
frequently citing d'Ailly and Biel and naming Ockham at least twice.'
Luther's significant contact with nominalism has led some scholars, notably
Heiko Oberman, to conclude that an Augustinian brand of nominalism had a
tremendous impact on the development of Luther's theology. Oberman points
specifically to Gregory of Rimini as the key figure in transmitting this theology.
Taking stock of this cumulative, admittedly circumstantial evidence, we can
point to the schola Augustiniana moderna, initiated by Gregory of Rimini,
reflected by Hugolin of Orvieto, apparently spiritually alive in the Erfurt
Augustinian monastery, and transformed into a pastoral reform-theology by
Staupitz, as the occasio proxima—not causa! —for the inception of the
theologia vera at Wittenberg."
According to Oberman, Augustinian nominalism rather than humanism or biblical
studies, is what set Luther travelling the via Gregorii on his road to Reformation.
David Steinmetz defines this Augustinian nominalism, the schola Augistiniana
moderna, as "a tradition of theology which stressed the centrality of grace for
justification and which minimized, without eliminating, the significance of the human
contribution.' In addition, Oberman contends Luther was not directly influenced
by humanism but rather benefited from the humanist tradition of his order."

'See Paul Vignaux, "Sur Luther et Ockham," Franziskanische Studien 32 (1950):2130.
"Oberman, "Headwaters," 82.
"David Curtis Steinmetz, Misericordia Dei: The Theology of Johannes von Staupitz
in its Late Medieval Setting (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1968), 33.
"Oberman, "Headwaters," 70-1.
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Similarly, Luther's encounter with scripture is dismissed as a begging of the question
when it comes to searching for the beginning of Luther's theology.14
Although the significance of Luther's nominalist training cannot be disputed or
ignored when discussing the development of his theology, the influence of
Augustinian nominalism does not sufficiently explain Luther's discovery of the
gospel." In fact, Luther's theology outstrips nominalism in emphasizing grace while
eliminating entirely the significance of the human contribution to justification. In the
Heidelberg Disputation, Luther explicitly rejected the nominalist teaching on
justification, when in thesis 16 he declared, "The person who believes that he can
obtain grace by doing what is in him adds sin to sin so that he becomes doubly
guilty.' This idea that God would not deny grace to the person "doing what is in
him" was central to nominalist anthropology and soteriology. The enormity of the
step Luther took in rejecting that is apparent in the reaction of his contemporaries.
Even Staupitz, who himself had opposed the nominalist doctrine of grace," could
not follow to the conclusions Luther eventually reached. Staupitz disagreed with the

'Ibid., 88.
See Leif Grane, Modus Loquendi Theologicus: Luthers Kampf um die Erneuerung
der Theologie (1515-1518) (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1975); Idem, Contra Gabrielem: Luthers
Auseinandersetzung mit Gabriel Biel in der Disputatio Contra Scholasticam Theologiam
1517. [s. 1.]: Gyldenhal, 1962.
15

"Martin Luther, Luther's Works (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House;
Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1955-1986), 31:40, WA 1:354.
"David Curtis Steinmetz, Misericordia Dei: The Theology of Johannes von Staupitz
in its Late Medieval Setting (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1968), 34.
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Reformation movement and died a convinced Roman Catholic, although even to the
end his affection for Luther remained undiminished."

Luther and Humanism
Luther's nominalism, for the most part, actually provided a negative
background for his evangelical theology. As Lewis Spitz points out,
In view of Luther's explicit rejection of scholasticism and specifically of
theological nominalism it would indeed be a mistaken notion to find the key to
his reformatory development and evangelical solution in the theology he was
reacting against."
According to Spitz, Luther's encounter with humanism and his biblical studies are far
more important for the development of his theology.
Throughout his life Luther demonstrated an interest in humanist disciplines.
He valued both the ideas and eloquence of the classics, and exhibited a more than
passing interest in history." In addition, the humanist emphasis on the classical

"Ibid., 15.
"Lewis W. Spitz, "Headwaters of the Reformation: Studia Humanitas , Luther Senior,
et Initia Reformationis," in Luther and the Dawn of the Modern Era, ed. by Heiko A.
Oberman (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1974), 113.
"Lewis W. Spitz, "Luther and Humanism," in Luther and Learning, ed. by Marilyn
Harran (London and Toronto: Associated University Presses, 1985), 77, 79. See also
Oswald Schmidt, Luthers Bekanntschaft mit den Alten Classikern: Ein Beitrag zur
Lutherforschung (Leipzig: Veit, 1883) and John Headley, Luther's View of Church
History (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1963). For an investigation
into the nature of Luther's early contacts with humanism see Helmar Junghans, Der
_lunge Luther and die Humanisten (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1985).
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languages and a return ad fontes meshed well with Luther's biblical studies. This
study of scripture in the original languages was of vital importance for the
development of Luther's theology. Thus Spitz refuses to minimize the impact of the
Bible on Luther.
The Biblical passages are set in a Biblical world and have an impetus of their
own which, when studied intensely, may well induce a changed or reformatory
perception of theology. . . . a number of Luther's Augustinian opponents had
backgrounds analagous to his own, but lacking his encounter with the Biblical
world, they remained what he might have been without his long and arduous
preoccupation with the Scriptures. To see his exegetical studies as the critical
determinant in his evangelical theology is more than a mere begging of the
question.'
Luther's exegetical work was, of course, aided by the contributions of humanism,
such as new editions of the Greek New Testament and a renewed interest in the study
of Hebrew." Luther knew humanism was helping him in his evangelical
breakthrough, prompting him to press Wittenberg to move away from scholasticism to
a more humanist oriented curriculum.
However, the contributions of humanism were important not only for Luther's
own development, but also for the reception of his evangelical doctrine. As Bernd
Moeller observes,
There can be no doubt that it was the humanists who were decisive in dragging
the Reformation movement, against Luther's will, out of the obscurity of the
humble University of Wittenberg into the light.'
2Isp•—
az, "Headwaters," 114.
22Junghans comments on the original work in Hebrew that went on at the University
of Wittenberg. Der junge Luther and die Humanisten, 60.

'Bernd Moeller, "The German Humanists and the Beginnings of the Reformation,"
in Imperial Cities and the Reformation (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1972), 26.
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Although most of the older humanists broke with Luther around 1520, many of their
younger colleagues became fervent supporters of the Reformation. Thus Moeller
concludes, "No humanism, no Reformation."' Similarly Spitz calls Luther's
positive attitude toward the liberal arts of the humanist disciplines "a fact of
fundamental importance for the beginnings and development of the magisterial
Reformation."' Obviously when searching for the beginnings of Luther's theology,
the net must be cast far wider than the schola Augustiniana moderna.

Luther and Mysticism
Luther's acquaintance with various mystical traditions and his appreciation of
specific mystics has been much investigated and debated.26 Luther was acquainted
with the writings of a number of mystics, including Dionysisus the Areopagite, Hugo
and Richard of St. Victor, Bernard, Bonaventure, Gerson, Bridget of Sweden, Tauler
and "the Frankfurter."' In discussing Luther's relationship to mysticism, most
scholars have taken up, with some minor modifications,' the three-fold division of

"Ibid., 36.
Spitz, "Headwaters," 116.

25

26See for example R. R. Post, The Modern Devotion: Confrontation with Reformation
and Humanism (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1968), 551-631.

'Erich Vogelsang, "Luther and die Mystik," in Luther-Jahrbuch 1937, ed. by Th.
Knolle (Weimar: Hermann Bohlau, 1937), 32-33. See also Bengt Hoffman, Luther and
the Mystics: A re-examination of Luther's spiritual experience and his relationship to the
mystics (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1976).
'For example, Steven Ozment has kept the three-fold division but reworked the
categories. The Age of Reform: 1250-1550 (New Haven and London: Yale University
Press, 1980), pp. 118-34. Cited in David G. Schmiel, "Martin Luther's Relationship to
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mysticism into Dionysian, Roman and German types used by Erich Vogelsang.29
Because Vogelsang's definition is an accurate and useful way to discuss Luther's
relationship to mysticism it will be used as the basis for the brief discussion presented
here.
It is generally agreed that Luther spoke an "emphatic no," as Vogelsang put it,
to Dionysian mysticism." Although the young Luther did on one occasion speak
positively of the Dionysian idea of the via negativa, in general he rejected this type of
speculative mysticism.' Erwin Iserloh has observed that for Luther such mysticism,
is not only unneccessary and leaves the heart empty, but is dangerous because
it leads man into the dangerous position of thinking that he can, either from
within himself by sinking into his own Seelengrund or through mystical ascent,
achieve union with God. 32

the Mystical Tradition," Concordia Journal 9 (1983): 47. Similarly Heiko Oberman has
pointed out that although Gerson is classified as a Roman mystic, he is in some points
closer to the Germans. "Simul Gemitus et Raptus: Luther und die Mystik," in The
Church, Mysticism, Sanctification and the Natural in Luther's Thought, ed. Ivar Asheim
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1967), 32.
Vogelsang, 33.

29

"Ibid., 33.
"Bengt Hagglund, "Luther und die Mystik," in The Church, Mysticism,
Sanctification and the Natural in Luther's Thought, 89.
'Erwin Iserloh, "Luther und die Mystik," in The Church, Mysticism, Sanctification
and the Natural in Luther's Thought, 64-5.
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Luther criticized the "pure innerness" of Dionysian mysticism, an attitude which also
led to his rejection of monasticism.33 He rejected the via negativa for the negative
theology of the cross.'
Luther's relationship to the Roman type of mysticism is far more ambiguous.
He rejected the visions of Bridget of Sweden as "pure illusions of Satan."35 On the
other hand, Luther generally voiced approval of Bernard and even adopted his
definition of mysticism as "sapientia experimentalis non doctrinalis."' Another
mystic often counted in this category and praised by Luther was Gerson." In
general, however, Luther criticized Roman mysticism for its lack of understanding of
spiritual Anfechtungen, its often erotic bridal mysticism, and its adherence to a system
of steps climbing to mystical union?'
To the German type of mysticism Luther responded with "an almost pure
yes."" Luther's enthusiastic reception and subsequent publication of the famous
Theologia Deutsch manuscript is well known.' Its anonymous author, known as

33Vogelsang,

35.

34"Luthers

negative Theologie ist das Kreuz, an dem Gott sich unter dem Gegenteil
verbirgt, unter dem Knecht, der ein Wurm ist and kein Mensch." Iserloh, 67.
35Vogelsang,

37.

'Ibid., 38.
"Ibid., 39.
38Ibid.,

40-1.

"Ibid., 33.
'See the introduction to Luther's preface, LW 31:73-4.
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"the Frankfurter," along with another German mystic, Johannes Tauler, played
extremely significant roles in Luther's development.' In Tauler, Luther found a
fellow-sufferer of spiritual Anfechtungen.42 Parallels between Luther and Tauler can
also be seen at times in their anthropology and soteriology, though there are also
many differences.' Luther praised these mystics, but significant differences in his
theology are also readily apparent. Although it has been suggested that Luther either
did not notice these differences or refrained from pointing them out,' it is more
likely that what Luther admired in these mystics was not necessarily their
mysticism." Rather he saw them confirming his own evangelical theology. 46 In
his preface to Theologia Deutsch Luther wrote,
I now for the first time become aware of the fact that a few of us highly
educated Wittenberg theologians speak disgracefully, as though we want to
undertake entirely new things, as though there had been no people previously
or elsewhere.'

°Oberman, "Simul Gemitus et Raptus," 38.
'Vogelsang, 43.
431-lagglund

enumerates parallels in anthropology (90-1), and concerning Tauler's
doctrine of justification writes, "Nach Tauler ist alles, was zur ErlOsung des Menschen
gehort, ausschliesslich Gottes Werk." 93. Ozment emphasizes the disparity between
Luther and Tauler in the area of anthropology. Homo Spiritualis, 214-16.
'Vogelsang, 43.
'Oberman, "Simul Gemitus et Raptus," 39.
'Thus Martin Brecht's treatment of Luther's encounter with German mysticism is
titled "Confirmation Through Mysticism," I, 137-44.
"LW 31:75-6, WA 1:378.
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It is significant, as Oberman points out, that Luther also spoke in this preface not of
German mysticism but of German theology." What Luther admired in this, as in
any other form of mysticism, was the personal experience of faith, which he
described as a real union of Christ with the believer, a joyous exchange, rather than
as a mystical union of the soul with God.' Here we find Luther's positive
relationship with the mystics and also the gulf that ultimately separated them.
Conciliarism on the Eve of the Reformation
In 1460 Pius H condemned conciliar theory in the bull Execrabilis." This
bull, forbidding appeals from the pope to a future council, was a part of Pius's effort
to strengthen the papal monarchy." However, this event by no means marks the
end of the conciliar movement. As Francis Oaldey has pointed out, "It is clear that
an altogether exaggerated importance has been accorded to Pius II's bull."' In fact,

"Oberman, "Simul Gemitus et Raptus," 40.
49Iserloh,

73. As Oberman points out, Luther's criticism of the Scwarmer was that
they did not go far enough in uniting Christ and the believer: "Sie unterscheiden den
Glauben im Herzen und Christus im Himmel, wohingegen doch gerade beides
unmittelbar miteinander verflochten hat. Uber diese Identifikation Christi und des
Christen sagt Luther knapp: 'Es geht nicht speculative sed realiter zu.'" 44-5.
50For an abridged text of the bull see Enchiridion Symbolorum Definitionum et
Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum, ed. by Henricus Denzinger and Adolfus
Schonmetzer (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1965), 345.

"Hans-Kirgen Becker, Die Appelation vom Papst an ein allgemeines Konzil:
Historische Entwicklung und kanonistische Diskussion im spaten Mittelalter und in der
fruhen Neuzeit (Kaln, Wien: 13ohlau Verlag, 1988), 163.
'Francis Oaldey, The Western Church in the Later Middle Ages (Ithaca and London:
Cornell University Press, 1979), 75.
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the bull was not widely disseminated and apparently was not even considered
authoritative by Pius's successors."
Thus the struggle with concilarism continued, especially as a group of
cardinals opposed to Julius II assembled in council at Pisa in 1511." Even though
this convocation owed more to French politics than to any real recrudescence of the
conciliar theory, it nevertheless led to some significant conciliar statements that
illustrate the state of the question on the eve of the Reformation. The author of one
of these statements was Jacques Almain.55 His Tractatus de auctoritate ecclesiae et
conciliorum generalium was written at the request of the University of Paris, still a
bastion of conciliarism, to counter a pro-papal tract authored by Cardinal Cajetan."
Although Almain used a unique argument from secular polity in reaching the
conclusion of his treatise, the conclusion itself echoed Gerson and other fifteenth

0akley, The Western Church, 75.

53

mNew Catholic Encyclopedia, s. v. "Lateran Councils, Fifth."

'Jacques Almain (1480-1515) studied under the Scottish scholastic theologian, John
Major, at the University of Paris. He received his doctorate in 1511. Francis Oakley,
"Conciliarism in the Sixteenth Century: Jacques Almain Again," in Archie fur
Reformationsgeschichte 68 (1977):113.
"Francis Oakley, "Almain and Major: Conciliar Theory on the Eve of the
Reformation," in Natural Law, Conciliarism and Consent in the Late Middle Ages:
Studies in Ecclesiastical and Intellectual History (London: Variorum Reprints, 1984),
675, 682. For a discussion of Cajetan's Auctoritatis papae et concilii seu ecclesiae
comparata see Gerhard Hennig, Cajetan und Luther: Ein historischer Beitrag zur
Begegnung von Thomismus und Reformation (Stuttgart: Calwer Verlag, 1966), 13-29.
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century conciliarists: "The church, or the general council representing it, is superior
in power of jurisdiction to the pope."'
Although the formulations of conciliar theory had changed little in a century,
the purpose for these formulations had. The overriding concern at both Constance
and Basel had been the reform of the church. However, Almain's treatise never
mentions such reform, leading Oakley to conclude that there had been a fundamental
shift in the focus of conciliar theory.
In the early years of the sixteenth century the conciliar theory, despite its
previous history, was becoming increasingly irrelevant to the question of
ecclesiastical reform, whether conceived in Protestant or Catholic terms.58
Therefore at Pisa in 1511, conciliar theory was primarily a weapon wielded against
Julius II's political aspirations.
Although the Council of Pisa accomplished little before it disbanded in 1512, it
led directly to the Fifth Lateran Council convened by Julius II.59 This council
opened in May of 1512 with the pope presiding.' It is noted chiefly for
condemning the Council of Pisa and rejecting the conciliar decrees of Constance and
Basel along with the Pragmatic Sanction of Bourges.81 As will be demonstrated,

570aldey,

"Almain and Major," 678.

'Ibid., 689.
590aldey,

"Conciliarism in the Sixteenth Century," 114.

'New Catholic Encyclopedia, s. v. "Lateran Councils, Fifth."
'These condemnations were stated in the bull Pastor aeternus, December 19, 1516.
Carl Stange, "Luther and das Konzil zu Pisa von 1511," in Zeitschrift fur Systematische
Theologie 10 (1933): 693-4. See also Denzinger, 355-6.
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these condemnations were important in developing Luther's attitude toward conciliar
authority. Significantly the Fifth Lateran Council issued no decrees. Rather its
decisions were published in the form of papal pronouncements.' It was a council
completely dominated by the pope and by the papal theory of church government.
Naturally the council did not address the reform of the papacy itself and thus failed to
satisfy those who desired real reform of the church—a fact of considerable
significance for the reception of the Reformation.

Conclusion
Conciliarism continued as a force to be reckoned with, especially within the
empire, as Luther began his own struggle with the papacy. Conciliar theory had been
forged into a powerful weapon by previous generations of nominalist theologians.
The extent to which Luther did or did not employ the theory has much to say about
his relationship with the entire medieval tradition. To this end, we turn now to
examine Luther's statements on the authority of the papacy and the general councils.

'New Catholic Encyclopedia, s. v. "Lateran Councils, Fifth."

CHAPTER 5
LUTHER ON THE PAPACY AND GENERAL COUNCILS
The view of the mature Martin Luther on papal authority is epitomized by the
title of his 1545 treatise Against the Roman Papacy an Institution of the Devil.
Luther employed harsh language in condemning the papacy and the Roman church,'
but there was principle behind his polemic. Here he declared once again that the
pope had no right to rule over either spiritual or temporal affairs.
It is very easy to prove that the pope is neither the head of Christendom, nor
lord of the world above emperor, councils, and everything, as he lies,
blasphemes, curses, and raves in his decretals, to which the hellish Satan
drives him.2
Luther had voiced his final opinion on the authority of general councils six years
earlier in On the Councils and the Church. The judgment of Luther on the authority
of church councils reflected his reliance on scripture alone. For Luther the church
was dependent on scripture not scripture on the church, and thus the church did not
require the decisions of councils.
In summary, put them all together, both fathers and councils, and you
will not be able to cull from them all the teachings of the Christian

'For example, Luther addressed the pope as "The Most Hellish Father" and as the
"bishop of hermaphrodites and pope of Sodomists, that is, the apostle of the devil." LW
41:263, 288, WA 54:208, 227. Wherever only the Weimar Edition is cited the
translation is mine.
'LW 41:290, WA 54:228.
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faith, even if you culled forever. If it had not been for Holy Scripture,
the church, had it depended on the councils and fathers, would not have
lasted long.'
Therefore councils should not have and never had the authority to define anything
contrary to scripture or to require anything in addition to scripture.
While Luther's final position on authority in the church obviously had little in
common with his predecessors in either the papal or conciliar camps, his view had
developed over a period of years. This development is significant in evaluating the
influence of conciliarism on his doctrine of the church. Thus the following discussion
will highlight Luther's statements on the authority of the papacy and church councils
in roughly chronological order and will emphasize his views during the period 1517
to 1521. These subjects have been studied extensively in the secondary literature and
cannot be treated exhaustively here.' The purpose of this brief study is to provide a
framework for comparing Luther and Gerson on the subject of authority in the
church.

LW 41:52, WA 50:546-47.
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4See for example, Scott H. Hendrix, Luther and the Papacy: Stages in a Reformation
Conflict (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1981); Ernst Bizer, "Luther und der Papst,"
Theologische Existenz Heute 69 (1958); Th. Kolde, Luthers Stellung zu Concil und
Kirche bis zum Wormser Reichstag, 1521 (Giitersloh: C. Bertelsmann, 1876); Remigius
Baumer, Martin Luther und der Papst, 5th ed. (Munster: Aschendorff, 1970); Christa
Tecklenburg Johns, Luthers Konzilsidee in ihrer historischen Bedingtheit und ihrem
reformatorischen Neuansatz (Berlin: Alfred TOpelmann, 1966).
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The Authority of the Pope
Luther did not, of course, begin his career at Wittenberg intending to attack
the structures of the medieval church. In later life he characterized himself as "a
most enthusiastic papist" in the years prior to the indulgence controversy.5 At the
time the question of the relationship between pope and council had no particular
interest for him.' In fact, Luther's first lectures on Psalms reveal a positive attitude
toward both the papacy and the ecclesiastical hierarchy.' His attitude simply
reflected the prevailing belief in the church, an attitude strongly influenced by ideas
of papal monarchy.'
Luther's conflict with the papacy began in 1517 with the indulgence
controversy.' When Luther penned his Ninety-Five Theses, he aimed his attack at the
theological foundation and pastoral practice of indulgence sales rather than at the pope

'Preface to the Complete Edition of Luther's Latin Writings, LW 34:328. The Latin
phrase Luther used, "papistam insanissimum," could be interpreted much more strongly,
WA 54:179.
"Kolde, 12.
'Hendrix, Luther and the Papacy, 12-13.
'Hubert Jedin, "Ekidesiologie um Luther," Fuldaer Hefte 18 (1968): 12.
90n the background and beginning of this controversy see Martin Brecht, Martin
Luther: His Road to Reformation 1483-1521, trans. by James L. Schaaf (Philadelphia:
Fortress Press, 1985), 175-201; Heinrich &Amer, Luther in Light of Recent Research,
trans. by Carl F. Huth, Jr. (New York: The Christian Herald, 1916), 167-201; E. G.
Schwiebert, Luther and His Times: The Reformation from a New Perspective (St. Louis:
Concordia Publishing House, 1950), 303-330; Julius KOstlin, Martin Luther: Sein Leben
and seine Schriften, ed. Gustav Kawerau, 5th ed. (Berlin: Alexander Duncker, 1903),
1:144-61.
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himself.' However, his opponents—Prierias, Wimpina, Cajetan, and
Eck—recognized that certain of Luther's propositions concerning indulgences
endangered the pontiff's authority." For example, in Thesis 6 Luther stated, "The
pope cannot remit any guilt, except by declaring and showing that it has been remitted
by God."" In his Explanations of the Ninety-Five Theses, published in the summer
of 1518, he argued that to say the pope can remit sins is either "a figurative manner
of speech or an idea inconsistent with the wording of the Gospel."' In the
Explanations Luther clearly defined the impact of his theses on papal authority. He
cautioned against relying on papal pronouncements in the uncertain matter of
indulgences, since even the pope dare not decide "heedlessly" in matters of faith."
Clearly Luther did not accept every papal pronouncement as authoritative.
I listen to the pope as pope, that is, when he speaks in and according to the
canons, or when he makes a decision in accordance with a general council. I
do not listen to him, however, when he speaks his own mind."

'In a letter written to Pope Leo X and presented to Miltitz on January 5 or 6, 1519,
Luther stated that he had never intended to touch the power of the pope or of the Roman
church. LW 48:101, WA Br 1:292.
"Baumer, Martin Luther and der Papst, 16.
"LW 31:26, WA 1:233.
"LW 31:98, WA 1:539.
l'ILW 31:147, WA 1:568.
"LW 31:171, WA 1:582.
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Neither is the pope given additional authority when he is thought to embody the
Roman church.' Thus Luther concludes, "It is only right to give preference to the
truth first, and then to the authority of the pope and the church."17 In addition, it is
significant that Luther treated papal authority under Romans 13 rather than Matthew
16, that is, in the realm of the left hand rather than the right." He spoke of the
papacy as God's institution in the same breath as all earthly kingdoms. As Scott
Hendrix rightly points out, the Explanations reveal that Luther was "certainly no
papalist on church authority."'
However, Luther also expressed respect for Pope Leo X in the Explanations.
Finally, we now have a very good pope, Leo X, whose integrity and learning
are a delight to all upright persons. But what can this man who is so worthy
of our respect do amid such confusing circumstances? He is worthy of having
become pope in better times, or of having better times during his
pontificate.'
Luther believed that it was the pope's chief duty, and Leo's personal desire, that the
Word of God be preached.21 Luther attributed the sorry state of the church to the

'LW 31:217, WA 1:608.
"LW 31:222, WA 1:611.
"LW 31:234-35, WA 1:618. See also Karl Ho11, "Die Entstehung von Luthers
Kirchenbegriff," in Gesammelte Aufsatze zur Kirchengeschichte I: Luther (Tubingen: J.
C. B. Mohr, 1932), 313.
'Hendrix, Luther and the Papacy, 40.
"LW 31:204, WA 1:604.
21 "It is the duty and intention of the pope to desire the Word of God to be preached
above everything else, always, and everywhere, as he knows he has been commanded
by Christ to do." LW 31:209, WA 1:606.
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Roman curia rather than to the pope personally, describing Leo as "besieged rather
than surrounded by so many monstrosities of devils and godless men."22 In spite of
the situation in Rome, Luther continued to call for obedience to papal authority.'
Yet this was by no means the same obedience advocated by his opponents. "It is not
for us to judge the will of the pope, but only to endure it, even if it should upon
occasion be evil, as I have said previously. X24 The pope's will must be obeyed,
perhaps even more than that of any other earthly ruler, but not necessarily as the will
of God. Luther's early position on papal authority was, as Hendrix has observed,
ambivalent at best.25
Before Luther's Explanations were published, Tetzel himself attacked
Luther's position by debating a series of theses justifying indulgences.26 Soon
another opponent appeared, the Ingolstadt theologian John Eck, whose attack on
Luther was entitled Obelisks.' Eck accused Luther, among other things, of being

nLW 31:204, WA 1:604.
23LW 31:236, WA 1:619.
LW 31:248, WA 1:626.
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'Hendrix, Luther and the Papacy, 21.
'The theses had been prepared by Konrad Koch, also known as Wimpina. Brecht,
207. Luther expressed his opinion about these theses in the Explanations: "They are so
foolishly and ignorantly composed that I cannot believe that the man under whose name
they are published and the man who has composed them understand them. This fact is
very evident to anyone who is fairly intelligent and well versed in the Scriptures." LW
31:87, WA 1:532-33.
"Oh ell sks were used in the Middle Ages for marking false or heretical statements.
Brecht I, 211; Kostlin, Martin Luther, 1:172.
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full of the poison of Bohemian heresy and of overturning the ecclesiastical
hierarchy.' Luther replied with his Asterisks." In addition to further arguments
concerning indulgences, Luther expressed outrage that Eck should defend papal
authority at the expense of the will of God.
It is a horror to me to hear, not from a Jew, not from a Turk, not from a
Bohemian heretic, but from a catholic theologian that the judgments of the
Church are not in the will of God alone. If you teach the people in this way,
you are not a prophet but a destroyer of the Church."
This issue had been raised in the debate over penance. Luther argued in the
Explanations that if the penance taught by Christ refers to the sacrament of penance
and the pope is able to alter this sacrament according to his will, then the authority of
the pope is placed over divine law and his will is superior to God's." Spurred on
by Eck, Luther continued the critique of papal authority he had begun in the
Explanations.
Although Luther did not resume the debate with Eck until the following
summer, he soon faced several other opponents as a result of the proceedings that
were begun against him in Rome. The first of these, Prierias, had been
commissioned to prepare a theological opinion on Luther's case. In this connection

"Kostlin, Martin Luther, 1:172.
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Asterisks were used to mark the most valuable texts. Brecht, 211.
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mihi est audire, non a Iudaeo, non a Turco, non a Behomo haeretico, sed
a Theologo catholico, suffragia Ecclesia non esse in arbitrio Dei solius. Tu si sic doce
populum, non concionator, sed vastator es Ecclesiae." WA 1:297.
"LW 31:88, WA 1:533.
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he published his Dialogue Against the Presumptuous Conclusions of Martin Luther.'
The document came to Luther at the beginning of August 1518," and he answered
in the same month with his Response to the Dialogue of Sylvester Prierias Concerning
the Power of the Pope.' As the title indicates, the authority of the pope had
become one of the principle subjects for debate. However, Luther did not directly
attack papal authority but continued to focus on the current practice concerning
indulgences, arguing that Prierias had misunderstood him and accused him of an irony
which was not intended.
I do not speak ironically but plainly, that for everyone the Pope has greater
favors than indulgences, namely the Gospel and the favors of the cures and all
things that are written in I Corinthians 12, not in his person but in his
power . . .35
In addition, Luther again asserted his respect for the person of Leo X, comparing him
to Daniel in Babylon.' On the other hand, Luther refused to state, as Prierias had,
that the church was virtually present in the papacy." Instead Luther insisted the
church was virtually present only in Christ, noting that the pope could err." Thus,
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as Martin Brecht has observed, "The entire subsequent conflict with Rome was
thereby fundamentally programmed."39
In October 1518 Luther met with Cardinal Cajetan, the papal legate, in
Augsburg.' Luther's account of this meeting was published in November 1518
under the title Proceedings at Augsburg." Cajetan had been instructed specifically
not to debate with Luther, so when Luther asked to be shown his errors, Cajetan
simply referred to the bull of Clement VI concerning indulgences, known as the
Extravagante.42 When Luther refused to accept the authority of this bull, Cajetan
"began to extol the authority of the pope, stating that it is above church councils,
scripture, and the entire Church."' After further discussion they reached no
agreement, and the interview was concluded. On the following day Luther read a
statement subjecting himself to the judgment of the church." In addition, he
prepared a written response to Cajetan, widening his critique of the papacy. He
wrote, "The words of the pope alone would be an ineffective defense against a
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contentious or heretical person."' Furthermore, he accepted as authoritative only
those papal decretals that "are in agreement with Holy Scripture and the decretals of
previous popes."' Luther's reference to the decretals of previous popes is
significant. It demonstrates he had not yet completely rejected papal authority as a
result of the debate over indulgences.
Thus, as Scott Hendrix has stated, Luther's appeal from Cajetan to the pope
was "not inconsistent with his attitude toward the papacy at this time."' Luther
refused to believe that Leo personally had been responsible for the instructions
delivered to Cajetan, namely, that if Luther refused to recant he should be
arrested." Therefore, Luther appealed to the pope to be "better informed."'
Luther only wished to debate the matter of indulgences," but because this was an
uncertain matter and because Cajetan had been unable to expose Luther's error,
Luther appealed now to the judgment of the pope.' As Martin Brecht has observed,
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this appeal was "one of the few alternatives still available in the bungled situation in
Augsburg."52
At the time of his appeal to the pope, Luther was already considering an
appeal to a counci1.53 The desirability of this action had become apparent by the end
of October when Luther saw a copy of the pope's instructions to Cajetan for the
interview at Augsburg. At the same time, Saxon Elector Frederick was instructed to
have Luther sent to Rome or drive him out of Saxony .54 An appeal to a council
became necessary in November when Leo X issued the bull Cum postquam defining
the papal doctrine of indulgences and refuting Luther's claims.55 Accordingly,
Elector Frederick received an ultimatum concerning Luther's case, prompting
Luther's appeal to a future council.56 He claimed a council's judgment was superior
to that of the pope in matters of faith and insisted an appeal to a general council
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cannot be forbidden by pope or prince.' The pope's fallibility was emphasized in
stronger terms here than any Luther had employed before.
He who acts in place of God on earth, whom we call the pope, inasmuch as he
is a man like us, raised up by men and (as the apostle says) surrounded by his
own infirmity, is able to err, to sin, to lie, and to become vain. Neither is he
exempted from that general sentence of the prophet, "Every man is false."'
This statement is confirmed by an example from scripture. Even Peter, "first and
most holy of all popes," needed to be rebuked by Paul when he was in error." This
example has been preserved, Luther concludes, so that "we, the head as well as the
members, might be assiduously warned by [Paul's] most necessary and salutary
example."' So, too, the pope may well need to be corrected by a general council in
the indulgence matter because "the power of the pope is not against or above but for
and under the Scriptures."'
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In the wake of his appeal and as a result of negotiations with Karl von
Miltitz," Luther did not immediately issue any further public statements on the
papacy or indulgences, although his correspondence continued to reflect his
disillusionment with the pope.' In the spring of 1519, however, Luther was drawn
into the fray again when his Wittenberg colleague Karlstadt agreed to debate John Eck
in Leipzig.' The theses Eck prepared for this debate were aimed at Luther rather
than Karlstadt, culminating in the issue of papal authority.' In his thirteenth and
last counterthesis, Luther questioned the foundation of the papacy and the primacy of
the Roman church.
Even before the debate, Luther defended this thesis at length under the title
Resolutio Lutheriana super propositione XIII. de potestate papae,66 where he openly
attacked the doctrinal foundations of papal supremacy.' He maintained that
submission to the papacy was God's will only in the broad sense that all who rule on
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earth do so with God's permission, as Romans 13 states.68 In conjunction with this
declaration, Luther expounded those scripture passages used traditionally to support
the papacy—Matthew 16 and John 21. He observed that in Matthew 16 the keys are
not given to Peter alone but to the whole church, as Chrysostom also had
maintained.69 According to Luther, the pro-papal exegesis of John 21 was even
more questionable. Christ's words to Peter, "Feed my sheep," cannot possibly be
understood as granting power or authority." Instead they show that "the Roman
pontiff ought to preach and teach the word of God."' The overwhelming
conclusion is that papal power exists not by divine mandate but only by the right and
usage of men.72 Similarly the Roman church as a whole does not have any
particular right but only a special privilege of honor.73 Luther concluded,
Therefore he is not a heretic, who denies this privilege of the Roman church,
but that one is a perverter of the word of God, who by the faith of Peter
understands a privilege of temporal power.'
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A primacy of honor, conditional on love and shepherding, belongs to Peter and his
successors. A primacy of power does not.75
The actual debate with Eck developed along these same lines. Luther
emphasized that the head of the church militant is not a man but Christ himself.'
This could be demonstrated by a simple observation: if the church is not without a
head when the pope dies, neither would it be without a head if there were no pope.'
When Eck appealed to the writings of Pseudo-Dionysius in defense of papal primacy,
Luther responded that Dionysius said nothing against his own position since he was
not arguing against the ecclesiastical hierarchy but against the papal monarchy.'
Luther maintained it could not be proved either from scripture or history that the
papacy existed by divine right. Once again he interpreted Matthew 16 not as
conferring power upon Peter but as a reference to Peter's faith. The church built on
this rock was not Peter's but Christ's.' In defending a divine foundation of the
papacy, Eck pointed to the rule of Peter and his successors. Luther countered first
with the observation that there could have been no church in Rome for twenty years
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after Christ's ascension, and therefore "it cannot be said that the Roman church is
first and chief by divine right.' He also pointed out that the bishops of the Greek
church had never been confirmed by Rome. If this confirmation were necessary, then
it must be concluded that even the most holy bishops of that church, such as Gregory
of Nazianzus, were "damned, heretics, and Bohemians.' The "Bohemians"
reference came in response to Eck's accusation that Luther merely reiterated the
errors of Hus and Wycliffe in rejecting the papacy.82 When Luther replied that
many of Hus's articles condemned at Constance were "plainly most Christian and
evangelical,' the debate shifted from the authority of the pope to the authority of
general councils.
The Leipzig Debate was not the final word in the development of Luther's
view of papal authority. Even before Leipzig, he had become convinced the pope
was the Antichrist. In a letter to Spalatin dated 9 December 1518, Luther wrote he
could prove that the pope was the Antichrist, but did not immediately voice this
conviction publicly." Leipzig changed that. Despite his criticism, Luther still
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wrote in May 1520 that the pope should not be opposed because "he has not arrived
at this power without God's providence—although I think he arrived at it not by the
gracious but more by the angry providence of God."" Less than a month later in To
the Christian Nobility Luther somewhat tentatively or perhaps reluctantly identified
the pope with the Antichrist.
The pope is not a vicar of Christ in heaven, but only of Christ as he walked
the earth. . . . Christ needs a vicar in the form of a servant, the form in which
he went about on earth, working, preaching, suffering, and dying. Now the
Romanists turn all that upside down. They take the heavenly and kingly form
from Christ and give it to the pope, and leave the form of a servant to perish
completely. He might almost be the Counter-Christ, whom the Scriptures call
Antichrist, for all his nature, work, and pretensions run counter to Christ and
only blot out Christ's nature and destroy his work."
Luther's criticism of Rome's tyranny was continued in The Babylonian Captivity of
the Church, also published in 1520. Here he denied the papacy was founded even
upon human authority," and he more strongly identified the papacy with the
Antichrist.
Unless they will abolish their laws and ordinances, and restore to Christ's
churches their liberty and have it taught among them, they are guilty of all the
souls that perish under this miserable captivity, and the papacy is truly the
kingdom of Babylon and of the very Antichrist. For who is the "man of sin"
and "the son of perdition" but he who with his doctrines and his laws
increased the sins and perditions of souls in the church, while sitting in the
church as if he were God?88
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The pope and curia, according to Luther, had revealed their true character by their
actions. They were not servants, but rulers and even slaveholders. They had not set
Christians free by the word of God but had held them captive to the words of men.
Thus, according to Ernst Bizer, "In the space of less than two years the monk who
had been faithful to the pope had become a rebel.""
In fall 1520 the bull proclaiming Luther's excommunication, Exsurge Domine,
was being posted in Germany by Eck." At the same time a solution to the conflict
between Luther and the pope was still sought by Miltitz, who encouraged Luther to
write a conciliatory letter to Leo." Even though Luther had already received the
news of his excommunication, he acquiesced and wrote to Leo but also included a
copy of his treatise The Freedom of a Christian. Some of Luther's statements in this
letter do indeed sound conciliatory, but he also did not shrink from his criticism of
the papacy.
I never intended to attack the Roman curia or to raise any controversy
concerning it. But when I saw all efforts to save it were hopeless, I despised
it, gave it a bill of divorce, and said, "Let the evildoer still do evil, and the
filthy still be filthy.""
Luther obviously intended no compromise with the Roman church. Any movement
would have to come, it seemed, from the pope's side. Although Bizer referred to this

"Bizer, Luther and der Papst, 9.
"An especially complete account of Eck's posting of Exsurge Domine is found in
Brecht, 400-404. On the background and contents of the bull see also Schwiebert, 48286; Kostlin, Martin Luther, 1:350-3.
"Brecht, 404-7; Schwiebert, 477-81; KOstlin, Martin Luther, 1:354-55.
"LW 31:338, WA 7:7.

101
letter as an "invitation to peace," Remigius Baumer is perhaps more accurate in
characterizing it as an "invitation to capitulation.' Whatever Luther's intention,
from this point he no longer believed an unrepentant papacy had any authority in the
church.'
Luther upheld this point of view at the Diet of Worms in 1521, clearly
rejecting the authority of both pope and council." As before, this position was
grounded in the scriptures. Years later Luther himself pointed out in Against the
Roman Papacy that the biblical basis for his argument against the papacy had not
changed since the Leipzig debate." By then he clearly rejected any argument for
papal authority, including a papacy existing by human right.
It was not instituted by the temporal authority, and even if it had been, it
would still have been from the devil. The reason is this: temporal authority
does not have the power to do this in the kingdom of God.97
Furthermore, anyone is capable of judging and condemning the pope. In a parody of
canon law Luther declared, "Of course no one on earth has the right to judge or
condemn the pope—except only everyone who is baptized, or still in possession of
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human reason, or all God's creatures."" Although the heightened polemical
language Luther employed in Against the Roman Papacy has been roundly
criticized," the position expressed was at bottom the same one adopted in 1520—a
complete rejection of the tyranny of Antichrist.
Some of recent scholarship concludes that Luther's final break with the papacy
occurred in 1520." The reasons for that break, however, continue to be debated.
The New Catholic approach, represented by scholars such as Remigius Baner, and
his mentor, Joseph Lortz, attributes Luther's opposition to the papacy to his
fundamental hatred for the papal church.' However, this theory hardly does
justice to the sources. First, it fails to account for Luther's apparent reluctance to
break with the pope. Even in his 1520 letter to Leo, Luther continued to attribute the
worst abuses of the papacy not to Leo himself but to the "godless flatterers"
surrounding him and to his predecessors.' Second, it ignores Luther's consistent
application of scripture in evaluating papal claims of authority. The explanation of
Luther's opposition offered by Hendrix is much more satisfactory.
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In brief, [Luther's] attitude passed through a number of stages from initial
ambivalence to persistent rejection while all the time he evaluated the papacy
by the criterion of whether it exercised it pastoral duty of nourishing people in
the church with the word of God.le°
Luther wanted everything in the church, including the papacy, to be judged by and
subject to the word of God. As we will see, he applied this same standard to the
councils of the church.
The Authority of a Council
Luther's statements on the authority of a general council first became an issue
with the publication of his Explanations of the Ninety-Five Theses. In his discussion
of thesis 20, Luther noted his opponents had no clear passage of scripture or
canonical text to cite in their defense. The reason for this, Luther observed in biting,
ironic fashion, was that the indulgence matter had not been established as an article of
faith because it had never been supported by the decision of a general council."' In
order to be authoritative, papal statements required either the support of existing
canons or the decision of a council. t05 In matters of faith, such as the granting of
indulgences, the decision of a council would be necessary before any opinion could be
declared heretical.
Even if the pope along with a large part of the church should feel thus and so,
and even if it were true that he does not err, it is still not a sin, nor is it a
heresy, to take the opposite position, especially in something which is not
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necessary for salvation, until the one position has been rejected by a general
council and the other approved.'
Although Luther questioned the authority of the pope, he believed a general council
did have the right to render a decision in matters of faith, serving as the highest
tribunal in the church."
Prierias was the first of Luther's opponents to question his statements on the
authority of a council. When Prierias asserted in his Dialogue that the church was
present virtually in the pope and representatively in the college of cardinals,'
Luther responded that the church was present virtually only in Christ and
representatively only in a general council." He also quoted the statement of
Panormitanus that both popes and councils can err."° Prierias noted these citations
in his reply and accused Luther of perpetuating the errors of the conciliarists,
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especially Panormitanus and Gerson."' He chided Luther, "These little
doctors . . . are the cause of many errors for you, Brother Martin."'
Cajetan also assumed that Luther was simply another conciliarist. In his
attempt to convince Luther of the pope's superior authority "he called attention to the
rejection and dissolution of the Council of Basel and was of the opinion that the
Gersonists as well as Gerson should be condemned."' Luther responded this was
something new to him and again denied that the pope was above the council and
scripture, while praising the recent appeal to a future council made by the University
of paris. 114 Apparently Luther did not believe that even the pope could be as ardent
a papalist as his legate, Cajetan."5
The next place Luther expressed his opinion of a general council was his 1518
appeal to such a future gathering. Because this appeal was made necessary by the
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progress of Luther's canonical trial,16 many scholars have dismissed it as no more
than a political maneuver."' It has also been pointed out, with some justification,
that the language of the appeal does not necessarily reflect Luther's own thought since
it was written by a notary."' The language used may simply be the legal formula
used for such an appeal and bear little or no relation to Luther's understanding of a
council. A related question is the influence of the Paris University appeal on Luther's
call. It has been suggested that the first portion of Luther's appeal, including the
definition of a general council, is adopted almost word for word from the Paris
document. However, other scholars argue for little or no real correspondence
between the two.19 Since Luther dictated the contents of the appeal then drafted by
the notary, it would seem to reliably reflect his opinion.1" The appeal clearly
states, "The most holy Council legitimately gathered in the Holy Spirit, representing
the holy catholic church, is above the Pope in matters concerning the faith."121 In
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his reply to Prierias Luther had expressed his opinion in similar language, suggesting
his appeal to a council was more than a political maneuver and may well have
sincerely expressed his belief in the superiority of a council to the pope.122
An appeal from the pope to a future council had been condemned by Pius II in
the bull Exsecrabilis and again by Julius II In his bull Suscepti regiminis.' 23
However, Luther knew this prohibition was not widely accepted outside of Rome.'"
His appeal clearly stated it was not within the office of the pope to prohibit an appeal
from his judgment to that of a future council.' An opinion preserved in the
Reichstagakten of 1519 takes the same position, stating that only a council can judge
Luther.
The council alone is able to decide whether Dr. Martin has written against the
faith. He has appealed to the council and thereby the hand of the pope is
closed. The prohibitions of Pius II and Julius II are powerless, because they
contradict natural law and divine law and also the Council of Constance. They
are, moreover, not recognized by the University of Paris.'26
Thus Luther's appeal to a future council had the desired political effect. He renewed
his appeal to a council in 1519, and in an obvious attempt to influence the laity,
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copies were published in German as well as Latin in 1520. The main text was
identical to the 1518 appeal, although Luther added a statement justifying his case.
Leo, "in his impious tyranny," had condemned Luther without a hearing and then
negated his appeal to a council.'
Between these two appeals, however, Luther's view of church councils had
changed as a result of the Leipzig debate. Even before the debate, Eck had
condemned Luther's proposition on the papacy for perpetuating the errors of Hus and
Wycliffe already condemned by the Council of Constance." Naturally Eck pressed
this point in his debate with Luther.' In rebuttal Luther observed that many of
Hus's articles had been unjustly condemned at Constance.13° For example, the
council had numbered among Hus's heretical statements his assertion that there is one
universal church.131 Since the council had stumbled on so obvious a point, Luther
questioned its judgment on the other articles as well.
Then I do not care whether that article, "It is not necessary for salvation to
believe that the Roman church is superior to all others,"is by Wycliffe or Hus,
because I know that Gregory of Nazianzus, Basil the Great, Epiphanius of

'"WA 7:80.
"Ebneter, 11.
""Hinc inter damnatos et pestiferos errores Iohannis Wikleff damnatus est et ille:
Non est de necessitate salutis credere Romanum ecclesiam esse supreman inter alias. Sic
inter pestilentes Iohannis Hus errores ille quoque connumeratur: Petrus non est nec fuit
caput Romanae ecclesie sancte catholice." WA 2:275.
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Cyprus and innumerable other Greek bishops have been saved, and yet they
did not hold this article [that the Roman church is superior to all others].132
For Luther the judgments of the council could not contradict the clear words of
scripture. For support he once again cited the statement of Panormitanus that the
opinion of a private person could be superior to that of the pope or a council if the
assertion is founded on better authority or reason."
Eck did not hesitate to take advantage of Luther's position. He accused Luther
of speaking against the Council of Constance in which the Bohemians had been
condemned by learned men.' At first Luther was unwilling to admit he had
spoken against Constance in his support of the articles of Wycliffe and Hus.135 He
defended his position by referring to Augustine's caution that all writings except
scripture must be read judiciously. Eck argued that Augustine excepted the decrees of
the popes and councils. To this Luther responded, "It is said, but not proved."'
Augustine supported Luther's reasoning that the council was only a servant of the

"2"Deinde ille 'Non est de necessitate salutis credere, Romanam ecclesiam esse aliis
superiorem', sive sit Wikleff sive Ha, non curo: scio quod salvati sunt Gregorius
Nazanzenus, Basilius magnus, Epiphanius Cyprius et innumerabiles alii Gretie Episcopi,
et tamen hunc articulum non tenuerunt, . . ." WA 2:279.
133

"Quinetiam ipse Iuriste, de quibus minus videretur, in ca: significasti, de elect:
statuerunt, prevalere unius privati hominis sententiam tam pontifici Romano quam
Concilio et ecclesie, si meliore auctoritate nixus fuerit vel ratione." WA 2:279, cf.
2:288.
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word of God, which alone is infallible.'" In good humanist fashion, Luther knew
the history and worked with the text. For Luther the conclusion was inescapable: "A
council is able to err."'"
However, Luther did not entirely dismiss the authority of a council. He
further defined his position by stating that a council is able to err "especially in those
matters that do not concern faith,'" hardly a radical statement since a council's
infallibility had been traditionally defended only where matters of faith were
concerned. However, Luther defined a council in such a way that he was not bound
to defend its decisions even in matters of faith. Because a council was composed of
fallible human beings, it could err. And if it did err, it was no longer a true
council.'4o
Eck recognized that Luther's critique of conciliar decisions was based entirely
on his interpretation of scripture. Therefore Eck emphasized that although the church
does not make the gospel, it has been given the authority to interpret scripture."'
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However, Luther would not accept this argument because he insisted scripture had to
be interpreted properly even by a council. Scripture is not properly understood, he
argued, unless it is understood as a whole rather than in parts. 142 Luther had
already displayed his allegiance to this hermeneutical principle in Augsburg when he
refused to accept the interpretation of scripture presented in the Extravagante.'"
Then in Leipzig, Luther stated explicitly what had been implicit in his discussion with
Cajetan.
Following the debate, Luther wrote his Resolutions on the propositions he had
presented there for Spalatin.' Luther had already argued extensively from church
history in the course of the debate with Eck. Upon further reflection and study he
made an important discovery about the authority of general councils. Luther came to
believe that the recent councils had been more susceptible to error than the ancient
ones. Thus Constance was more prone to err than Nicaea.145 Furthermore, he
discovered additional support for his argument against the decisions of Constance:
'42"Non est iste modus scripturas divinas feliciter intelligendi vel interpretandi, si ex
diversis locis diversa decerpantur dicta nulla habita ratione vel consequentie vel
collationis: immo iste est canon errandi vulgatissimus in sacris literis. Oportet ergo
theologum, si nolit errare, universam scripturam ob oculos ponere et contraria contrariis
conferre . . ." WA 2:361.
'43 "The Extravagante did not impress me as being truthful or authoritative for many
reasons, but especially because it distorts the holy Scriptures and audaciously twists the
words (if indeed their customary meaning should still be accepted) into a meaning which
they do not have in their context, in fact into a contrary meaning." LW 31:262, WA 2:8.
"Vesolutiones Lutherianiae super propositionibus suis Lipsiae disputatis, WA 2:391435.
'WA 2:399. In Contra Malignum lohannis Eccii, Luther stated his belief that
councils such as Nicaea that were truly ecumenical were rare, WA 2:627.
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both Constance and Basel had been condemned by the Fifth Lateran Council.'
Luther would pursue this argument from history further in On the Councils and the
Church.
Luther reached a new definition of what a true council should be in his
treatises of 1520. In To the Christian Nobility, he issued a call for a council free of
papal domination, complaining the Romanists "have given the pope full authority over
all the decisions of a council, so that it is all the same whether there are many
councils or no councils.' Luther denied that only the pope could call a council
and argued his authority should be ignored if used to prevent a free council.'
According to Luther the curia feared reform, and for this reason attempts of previous
councils to reform the church had been frustrated.' Luther urged the German
nobility to take advantage of the "time of grace" presented by Charles V's election in
order to reform the church.'"

146”. . . et in hoc imitabor novissimum Romanum Concilium, in quo Basiliense
damnatum est et Constantiense quoque passum non parva suae autoritatis detrimenta, dum
Papam supra Concilium esse sanxit, cuius contrarium in Constantiensi definitum est."
WA 2:400. John Headley understands Luther's argument correctly but misinterprets
"novissimum Romanum Concilium" as a reference to the Council of Basel, 227. Cf.
Carl Stange, "Luther and das ftinfte Laterankonzil," Zeitschnft ftir systematische
Theologie 6 (1929): 339-444.
'41W 44:127, WA 6:406.
"LW 44:137-38, WA 6:413-14.
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However, the most important argument Luther advanced in To the Christian
Nobility was the priesthood of all believers.151
It is pure invention that pope, bishops, priests, and monks are called the
spiritual estate while princes, lords, artisans, and farmers are called the
temporal estate. This is indeed a piece of deceit and hypocrisy. Yet no one
need be intimidated by it, and for this reason: all Christians are truly of the
spiritual estate, and there is no difference among them except that of office.
Paul says in I Corinthians 12 that we are all one body, yet every member has
its own work by which it serves the others. This is because we all have one
baptism, one gospel, one faith, and are all Christians alike; for baptism,
gospel, and faith alone make us spiritual and a Christian people.'"
This elimination of the distinction between clergy and laity knocked down the "first
wall" erected by the Romanists, namely, that spiritual power is superior to temporal
power.'" The "second wall," the pope's authority to interpret scripture, was razed
by recognizing that the keys have been given to all Christians and not to the pope
alone."' The "third wall," the assertion that only the pope could summon a
council, was similarly demolished. With this understanding that all Christians are
members of the spiritual estate, Luther declared it necessary for the nobility to
undertake reform of the church when the pope refused to do so and abdicated his
responsibility.
In The Babylonian Captivity of the Church, Luther applied his argument
against the papacy and for a free council to the matter of granting the chalice to the
'51Luther first mentioned the universal priesthood in a letter to Spalatin at the end of
1519. Kolde, 57-8.
'52LW 44:127, WA 6:407.
"'LW 44:126, WA 6:406.
LW 44:134, WA 6:411-12.
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laity. Luther noted that in this matter the authority of the Council of Basel could be
pitted against that of the Council of Constance.
I conclude, then, that it is wicked and despotic to deny both kinds to the laity,
and that this is not within the power of any angel, much less of any pope or
council. Nor does the Council of Constance give me pause, for if its authority
is valid, why not that of the Council of Basel as well, which decreed to the
contrary that the Bohemians should be permitted to receive the sacrament in
both kinds?'"
Although Luther denied the authority of previous councils, he maintained "it would be
a good thing, in my opinion, if this captivity were ended by the decree of a general
council."'" This seeming contradiction is explained by referring to Luther's new
definition of a council composed as a truly free assembly in which laity as well as
clergy had a voice. Luther wanted the preaching of the gospel and Christian liberty
to be restored by the action of such a council.'57
Luther also continued to judge previous councils by the standard of scripture
alone. Councils that decreed only human teaching he dismissed as "taverns and
schools of Jews."58 Luther declared, "I believe Christ, yes also St. Paul, his
apostle, more than all Councils."'" Luther's criticism of councils was debated at
the 1521 Diet of Worms, and his assertion that councils could err in matters of faith
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was named among his errors.' In his answer at the Diet, Luther voiced his
unwillingness to accept the authority of the pope or councils alone.
Unless I am convinced by the testimony of Scriptures or by clear reason (for I
do not trust either in the pope or councils alone, since it is well known that
they have often erred and contradicted themselves), I am bound by the
Scriptures I have quoted and my conscience is captive to the Word of God. I
cannot and I will not retract anything, since it is neither safe nor right to go
against conscience. May God help me. Amen. 161
Once again, Luther clearly stated his conviction that scripture must judge the
councils. However, Luther also acknowledged his willingness to submit to the
judgment of a council guided by scripture rather than by human tradition."
In the following years, Luther never deviated from this stand on conciliar
authority. He continued to hope for a free council, and steadfastly rejected any
proposal for a council that would be dominated by the pope. In 1535 Luther met with
the papal nuncio, Vergerio, who had been sent to Germany by Pope Paul III to
discuss the site of a proposed council. Luther told Vergerio plainly that the Roman
church was in need of a council but the evangelicals were not.
Our group does not need a council, for we already have the firm evangelical
teaching and order of service; but Christendom needs it, that that part which is
still held captive may discover error and truth."

"Baumer, Martin Luther and der Papst, 68-69.
16I

Brecht, 460.

'62Schwiebert, 507.
'63 WA 50, 164, translated in Schwiebert, 740.

116
Paul III issued the summons for a council in June of 1536. In response, Luther
drafted the Smalcald Articles at the request of Saxon Elector John Frederick.'
Luther's final and most extensive statement on the authority of church councils
came in 1539 in the treatise On the Councils and the Church, which he had begun to
write at the same time as the Smalcald Articles. According to Christa Tecklenburg
Johns, this work was the high point of the historical studies that Luther had
undertaken in last ten years of his life." Once again Luther criticized the papal
procedure of summoning a council.
He first sends his apostles into all lands to have kings and princes pledge their
allegiance to the pope's doctrines. The bishops and their clergy concur in this
strategy and absolutely refuse either to yield or to permit a reform, thus the
[course of the] council is already determined, before it even convenes, namely,
not to undertake any reforms, but to observe everything in accord with the
present practice. Isn't that a splendid council?'"
Luther admitted a council was necessary for a reformation of the church, but believed
that those who thought the pope "would or should participate" were misguided.'
In order to demonstrate the inadequacy and fallibility of councils, Luther examined
the history of the greatest councils of the church—the first four ecumenical councils.
Luther's historical study led him to conclude the great achievements of these councils
were nothing more than confirmations of the faith taught in scripture.'" Therefore,
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whenever a council established something new, it was not by the guidance of the Holy
Spirit.' Luther also noted that "bickering, confusion, and disorder prevailed" in
the councils, and agreed with the judgment of Gregory of Nazianzus: "I believe it is
advisable to flee all the councils of bishops."' Although Luther continued to
believe a free council would be useful, he expected such a council was not likely to
be held.
"Well," you say, "it is futile to hope for such a council." I myself think so
too. But if one wants to talk about it and asks and wishes for a council, one
would have to wish for a council like that, or forget about it completely, desire
none, and say nothing at all. For the first council in Nicaea, and the second
one in Constantinople were councils like that—whose example could indeed be
easily followed. And I point this out to show that it would be the duty of
emperors and kings, since they are Christians, to summon such a council for
the salvation of many thousands of souls that the pope, with his tyranny and
avoidance of a council (as far as he is concerned), allows to perish, even
though they all could be restored to St. Peter's article and to the true, ancient
Christian faith.171
Luther did not desire a council so his teaching might be judged and confirmed. He
was convinced that all who accepted the pure teachings of scripture were the true
church. His desire for a council resulted from his wish that the word of God be
proclaimed to all who were still held captive by the pope and the Roman church.

Conclusion
Luther's final statements in On the Councils and the Church are impossible to
reconcile with a late medieval conciliar viewpoint. However, this is not the case in
LW 41:122, WA 50:606.
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his earlier writings. In the Explanations of the Ninety-Five Theses Luther clearly
attributed real authority to the decisions of a general council. Many of the authorities
he quoted against papal opposition were famous conciliarists. He was especially fond
of the statement by Panormitanus that both popes and councils could err. Luther's
first appeal to a future council also obviously was influenced by conciliar thought.
The question remains: was Luther a conciliarist? If so, was he simply the latest in a
long line of medieval reformers and dissenters as many of his opponents claimed?
Did he represent a new development in the changing tradition of conciliarism? In
order to answer these questions, Luther's position must be compared to the views of
Gerson.

CHAPTER 6
LUTHER AND THE CONCILIAR LEGACY

Throughout his career Luther's assessment of Gerson was largely positive,
often speaking of Gerson as a "witness to the truth" and describing how he had begun
"to relax the reins of papal tyranny."' Luther cited Gerson frequently in the
indulgence controversy. In the argument with Prierias, Gerson provided Luther with
an additional authority to use against Prierias's citations of Thomas Aquinas.2 It
comes as no surprise that Luther's first opponents identified him as a conciliarist, and
even in the 1530s and 1540s such an identification seemed natural.' Whether such
label is justified can be demonstrated by comparing Luther and Gerson on the subject
of authority in the church.

'Heinz Zahrnt, Luther Deutet Geschichte: Etfolg and Mifietfolg im Licht des
Evangelium (Munich: Paul Muller, 1952), 58; Scott H. Hendrix, Luther and the Papacy:
Stages in a Reformation Conflict (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1981), 9.
'When Prierias cited Thomas in support of his argument that the church was virtually
present in the papacy, Luther responded: "Tu nihil pro to habeas, nisi nudam S. Thomae
narrationem, ego autem clarum textum Cle. et aperta verba Euangelii, deinde Gerson,
qui multis annis posterior Thoma dicit opiniones esse ad utramque partem probabiles in
hac re." WA 1:656.
'Hendrix, Luther and the Papacy, 9-10.
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Was Luther a Conciliarist? Gerson and Luther
on Authority in the Church
In comparing Luther and Gerson on authority in the church, several points of
convergence appear. Gerson's reaction to the schism was essentially a criticism of a
misuse of papal authority. His conversion to the via concilii directly resulted from
the unwillingness of either contender for the papal throne to abdicate for the good of
the church. Similarly, Luther's criticism of the practice of selling indulgences
contained an inherent criticism of papal authority that became clear as the controversy
unfolded. In order to correct these abuses of power, both Gerson and Luther
appealed to scripture and to a general council of the church. Much of Luther's
thought, particularly before Leipzig, appears very close to that of Gerson, especially
that of the time of Luther's first appeal to a council. However, thorough examination
reveals that these apparent convergences actually are overshadowed by tremendous
differences.
The existence of the papacy is a case in point. Gerson never questioned the
necessity of a single, earthly head—the pope—for the proper functioning of the corpus
Christi mysticum. Even in his conciliar treatises he affirmed the divine right of the
papacy.' As we have seen, Gerson was unwilling even to curtail drastically papal
authority. For example, he admitted only the pope should convene a general council
under normal circumstances.5 This attitude typified the majority of moderate
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conciliarists. As the election of Felix V at Basel demonstrates, even the more radical
conciliarists were unwilling, or at least unable, to dispense with the papacy entirely.
Luther exhibited a more fundamental critique of papal power. In the course of
the indulgence controversy, he upheld the authority of the papacy but refused to
regard it as the result of a divine foundation. Luther expressed this opinion from the
very beginning of the controversy, although in a rather subtle fashion. In his
Explanations of the Ninety-Five Theses he discussed papal authority in connection with
Romans 13 rather than citing the traditional proof text, Matthew 16. This criticism
was stated more openly in the debate with Eck, in which Luther flatly stated the
papacy did not exist by divine right. Luther drew out the implications of this
statement in 1520 when he denied the papacy had the exclusive right to summon a
council or interpret scripture.6 In the same year Luther denied even a human
foundation for papal authority.'
Gerson and Luther similarly diverge on appealing to scriptural authority. Such
authority was crucial to Gerson's argument for a conciliar settlement of the schism.
The authority of the council to judge the rival popes was based on its ability to
interpret scripture definitively.' However, the council's authority was not bound by
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scripture. Gerson also recognized as authoritative the decisions of a general council
concerning matters not treated in scripture—canonization, for example. He even
supported decisions that Luther later regarded as directly opposed to scripture, such
decisions as the condemnation of Hus and the prohibition of communion in both kinds
for the laity.
Luther accorded a higher place to the authority of scripture than did Gerson.
To be sure at the beginning of the indulgence controversy, Luther did not view
scripture as an exclusive authority. Instead he was concerned with maintaining a
consensus of authorities that supported him. According to Scott Hendrix, Luther
attempted "to base his own position inclusively on Scripture, the church fathers, and
decrees of the church."' This consensus was firmly in place in 1518 when he
affirmed those papal pronouncements that are "according to the canons" or "in
accordance with a general council."' However, the basis for Luther's consensus of
authorities changed as a result of the Leipzig Debate. Confronted with the logical
results of conciliar infallibility broadly conceived, Luther "realized more astutely that
Scripture in its clearest and most appropriate meaning had to govern that
consensus.' In the wake of Leipzig he defended the statement, "A simple layman
quoting scripture ought to be believed more than the pope or a council not quoting
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scripture."' In this instance Luther had Gerson on his side.' However, unlike
Gerson, Luther appealed to scripture as an ultimate and exclusive authority. In 1521
he wrote, "One must know that scripture without any glosses is the sun and the whole
light from which all teachers receive their light, and not vice versa.' Therefore,
he condemned any human teaching that went beyond the boundaries of God's word as
"erroneous, seductive, un-Christian, lying, and deceiving."5 Luther himself
recognized that in adopting this position he had moved far beyond Gerson.' He
could not look to the conciliarists for support, and already at this point he would not
have numbered himself in their company under the "conciliarist" banner.
In Gerson's ecclesiology, the authority of scripture was mediated by the
decisions of general councils. For him the council was the highest authority in
Christendom, the representation of the catholic church. This representation was made
by a gathering of Christian bishops and as such was infallible in deciding matters of
faith or establishing order for the rule of the church.' The general council was
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truly ecclesia congregata. This high view of conciliar authority triumphed at
Constance and lingered even after the dissolution of Basel and the official
condemnation of conciliarism.
Luther's final opinion on conciliar authority was diametrically opposed to
Gerson's, making it impossible in the end to call him a conciliarist in the traditional
sense of the term. Scripture judged the council rather than being judged by it.'
The council Luther proposed in To the Christian Nobility bears little resemblance to
the council of Haec Sancta. It is certainly quite possible that conciliar thought
influenced the young Luther. His earlier references to general councils could easily
bear a conciliar interpretation. In his Explanations to the Ninety-Five Theses, he
alluded to the need for a decision by a general council concerning indulgences.'
Until such a decision was made no opinion in the matter could be declared
heretical." But Luther clearly moved beyond those early ideas.
The most important piece of evidence for documenting Luther's adherence to
or distance from conciliarism is his 1518 appeal to a general council. According to
Remigius Baumer, Luther's conciliarism is proven by the simple fact of this appeal.
He argues that only a conciliarist would knowingly break the prohibition on appeals
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from the pope to a future council.' The text of the appeal, taken by itself, would
seem to support this contention. Luther appealed to "a most holy council,
legitimately gathered in the Holy Spirit, representing the holy catholic church."'
The similarity of this formula to those used by Gerson and other conciliarists is
undeniable. According to Remigius Baumer, who de-emphasized the similarities
between Luther's appeal and that from the University of Paris, the language of the
document expresses Luther's conviction. Nevertheless, Christa Tecklenburg Johns
maintains that Luther's appeal is not a conciliar document. She emphasizes both the
formal and legal nature of the language employed, and the similarity to the Paris
appeal.' According to Johns, "the Reformer did not call for a council on the basis
of conciliar theory, but on the basis of his own new theological understanding. "24
Scott Hendrix supports the conclusions of Johns. Hendrix sees Luther's appeal as a
logical extension of his attempt to maintain a consensus of authorities. For Luther,
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"even the verdict of a council must be supported by scripture, the church fathers, and
clear reason.""
Was Luther a conciliarist? The answer to that question depends on the
definition of conciliarism employed. If Baumer is correct in identifying the decisive
factor as the right of appeal to a future council, it must be admitted that Luther
exhibited conciliarist tendencies in 1518. But if the definition of conciliarism is
broadened to include the basis and rationale for ascribing authority to a general
council, it could be argued more easily that Luther had already moved beyond the
conciliar standpoint. The main tenet of fifteenth-century conciliarism was the
affirmation of the general council as the highest authority in the church. This
authority was granted by divine right and resulted from the council's function as a
genuine representation of the universal church. Such a definition of conciliarism is
supported by the writings of Gerson. Although the right of appeal from the pope to a
future council grew out of this definition of conciliar authority, that right in itself was
not central to conciliar theory.
Luther's appeal to a future council obviously did not result from this stream of
thought. As Hendrix points out, Luther had never argued "the conciliarist thesis that
the pope derives his authority from a council or that the council derives its authority
from Christ."' Although admittedly an argument from silence, it is perhaps
significant that Luther never referred to either the well-known Haec Sancta or
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Frequens in the course of his anti-papal polemic. What he expected from a general
council is apparent from the text of his appeal. Luther saw a council as the only body
capable of correcting the pope fallen into error, just as Paul had corrected Peter.'
He considered the judgment of the council superior to that of the pope, but the
council had to remain subject to scripture. Even before his appeal, in his interview
with Cajetan, Luther refused to allow questionable interpretations of God's word to
stand unchallenged. Although in 1518 Luther still had a higher opinion of general
councils than he would in later years, his was clearly an opinion of a different shade
than that expressed by the conciliarists.

Congregatio Fidelium: Luther's Doctrine of the Church
A renewed understanding of the relationship between scripture and church
formed the basis for Luther's position on the authority of the papacy and general
councils. The medieval tradition emphasized parallel streams of scripture and
tradition—the latter embodied in papal decrees and conciliar decisions—as
authoritative in the church.28 Gerson and other nominalists thought ecclesiastical
usage and tradition revealed the unwritten portion of the apostolic message, making
church an authority equal to scripture, if not in theory then at least in practice."
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This is why Gerson maintained a hierarchical conception of the church. For him the
collective authority of the hierarchy, especially the bishops, was needed both to
guarantee the infallibility of the church and to interpret scripture authoritatively.
Luther did not regard the church as an unconditional authority alongside or
apart from scripture." Instead he understood the church to be a creature of the
word.
The church has no power to make new divine promises of grace, as some
prate, who hold that what is decreed by the church is of no less authority than
what is decreed by God, since the church is under the guidance of the Holy
Spirit. For the church was born by the word of promise through faith, and by
the same word is nourished and preserved. That is to say, it is the promises
of God that make the church, and not the church that makes the promises of
God. For the Word of God is incomparably superior to the church, and in this
Word the church, being a creature, has nothing to decree, ordain, or make,
but only to be decreed, ordained, and made."
This understanding of the church obviously resulted from Luther's doctrine of
justification. The church is the assembly of those who are holy through faith in
Christ.' Luther's definition of the church was further influenced by his
understanding of the priesthood of all believers.
If they [the Romanists] were forced to grant that all of us that have been
baptized are equally priests, as indeed we are, and that only the ministry was

"Paul Althaus, The Theology of Martin Luther, trans. Robert C. Schulz
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1966), 338.
3'The
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Kirchengeschichte L. Luther (Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1932), 289, 304-5. See also
Althaus, 298 and John Headley, Luther's View of Church Nista.), (New Haven and
London: Yale University Press, 1963), 31.
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committed to them, yet with our common consent, they would then know that
they have no right to rule over us except insofar as we freely concede it. 33
As Karl Ho11 observed, this marked "an entirely new beginning for Luther's teaching
on the visible church."' A church created by the word which was the possession of
all believers could not be equated with any visible structure or hierarchy. Neither
could the church be identified with any single historic body of believers but had to be
recognized wherever the word of God was present.
Luther's doctrine of the church in 1520 was a rejection of his medieval
predecessors, whether papist or conciliarist. Moreover, even his earlier works exhibit
marked differences from traditional medieval statements on the nature of the church.
This is especially true of the first lectures on Psalms. Here Scott Hendrix has
identified what he terms Luther's 'fides-ecclesiology."' Luther took the
commonplace medieval description of the church as congregatio fidelium with great
seriousness. He identified the church with the true fideles, spiritual men who judge
all things (1 Corinthians 2:15). Hendrix states, "As far as this new definition of the
fideles is concerned, Luther's ecclesiology is complete in the Dictata. Only the
polemical application is lacking."'

33

LW 36:112, WA 6:564.

'Ha, 318.
"Scott Hendrix, Ecclesia in Via, 227.
'Hendrix, Ecclesia in Via, 187. Karl Holl saw this definition of fideles as an
implicit statement of the priesthood of all believers, "Die Entstehung von Luthers
Kirchenbegriff," 305-6.

130
Thus even Luther's early ecclesiology cannot be identified with the doctrines
of Gerson, distancing Luther even farther from the conciliar camp. Gerson,
influenced by nominalist theology and the mystical writings of Pseudo-Dionysius,
identified the church with the ecclesiastical hierarchy. Luther's rejection of a
hierarchically conceived church strikes at a central element in the combination of
nominalism and mysticism represented by Gerson. Although Luther profited from the
ideas of Gerson, particularly on confession and indulgences, their divergent doctrines
of the church reveal a fundamental difference in their thought. This same difference
has been documented by Steven Ozment with regard to the anthropology of Luther
and Gerson.' For this reason, the decisive influence in Luther's theological
development must be sought elsewhere than in nominalism and mysticism. That
decisive influence was Luther's study of scripture made possible by the contributions
of Renaissance humanism with its emphasis on text studies and history.

The Decisive Influence of Humanism
Although Luther did not advocate a return to the pure beginnings of the church
as did many humanists,' Renaissance humanism did furnish him with the tools for
rediscovering the scriptural doctrine of the church. Of critical significance was his

"Steven E. Ozment, Homo Spiritualis: A Comparative Study of the Anthropology of
Johannes Tauter, Jean Gerson and Martin Luther (1509-16) in the Context of Their
Theological Thought (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1969), 214. See also Walter Dress, Die
Theologie Gersons: Eine Untersuchung zur Verbindung von Nominalismus and Mystik im
Spatmittelalter (Giitersloh: C. Bertelsmann, 1931), 203-5.
"Wilhelm Maurer, "Der ekklesiologische Ansatz der abendlandischen
Kirchenspaltung nach dem Verstandnis Luthers," Fuldaer Hefie 18 (1968): 33.
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abandoning the four-fold method of interpretation, the common scholastic approach to
expounding biblical texts.39 For the most part Luther used this method in his first
lectures on Psalms.' However, by the time Luther lectured on Romans (15151516), the nature of the text itself led him to abandon the four-fold method."
Although this shift does not yet signal the adoption of a sola scriptura principle, it did
indicate Luther was beginning to break his ties to the scholastic tradition in which he
had been educated. Later on Luther saw the scholastic education he had received as a
hindrance to his study of the Bible.'
Luther's desire to engage the text of scripture itself can be attributed to the
influence of humanism." He was aided in his study of the Bible by new editions of
the Greek and Hebrew texts and by the renewed interest in these ancient languages.
Luther was extremely interested in Hebrew and made use of several of Reuchlin's
works in the course of his study." Of course, Luther also studied Greek. In 1516
he began to use Erasmus's Greek New Testament." Over time he became especially

See for example Gerson's Propositio facta coram anglicis.
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interested in the etymology of Greek words. That interest led him to the important
discovery of the true meaning of the word "repent" with which he began the NinetyFive Theses." The significance of biblical humanism for Luther's theological
development is obvious. E. G. Schwiebert states, "While Martin Luther was still a
confused and bewildered monk in the Black Cloister at Wittenberg, Biblical
Humanism was paving the way for his work as a Reformer."'
Luther's critique of ecclesiastical authority was, of course, based on scripture.
However, he also looked to history for support in the course of his arguments.
Luther himself stated that he had first attacked the papacy a priori on the basis of
scripture and later a posteriori on the basis of history.48 The "simple joy" Luther
found in the study of history was undoubtedly the result of humanist influence 49
From humanism he also learned the importance of text criticism." For example, he
noted the inclusion of fifty more canons of the Council of Nicaea in canon law than
Rufinus reported in his history.5' However, Luther also exhibited a great deal of
independence in his judgment of history. He did not allow himself to be led by the

"Junghans, 187.
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"Lewis W. Spitz, "Headwaters of the Reformation: Studia Humanitas, Luther Senior,
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humanist appeal to the ecclesia primitiva but recognized even in the first centuries of
the church's existence the inroads made by works and ceremonies.' At Leipzig,
arguments from history played an important part in Luther's case against the papal
plenitude of power. Earlier Luther had criticized Eck for his "ignorance of the
histories" in this connection.' History was also a decisive factor in Luther's
critique of the authority held by general councils.
Perhaps the most important discovery Luther made was recognizing that not all
the councils had been equal in authority. Luther considered Nicaea the greatest of all
the general councils. He judged it to have been far better and less likely to have
erred than the Council of Constance.' Unfortunately, truly ecumenical councils
such as Nicaea were rare.55 On the Councils and the Church coupled this positive
assessment of Nicaea with the recognition that Nicaea had done no more than confirm
the teaching of scripture.
And from what I have presented above one can see clearly that this council
neither thought up nor established anything new, but only condemned Arius'
new error against the old faith on the basis of Scripture—from which may be
inferred that no council (much less the pope in Rome) is authorized to think up
or establish new articles concerning faith or good works, as they so falsely
boast."
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Luther saw this same principle in each of the first four ecumenical councils and drew
the obvious conclusion from this discovery.
Since these four principal councils . . . neither intended nor were able to
create and establish anything new in matters of faith, as they themselves
confess, how much less then can one assign such power to the other councils,
which are to be regarded lower, if these four are and are to be called principal
councils."
In short no council had the authority to establish any new work or teaching but could
only confirm what is found in scripture.
Luther applied this principle most stringently to the Council of Constance. At
Leipzig Luther was forced by his admiration for the articles of Hus to question the
decisions of Constance, a council traditionally regarded as ecumenical. Although
Luther attempted to avoid a complete and general condemnation of Constance, he was
unable to do so.58 However, he did find support for his decision to abandon
Constance in the pronouncements of the Fifth Lateran Council.59 The ink was
hardly dry on this most recent assembly's condemnation of the conciliar decrees from
Constance and Basel. If these councils could so arbitrarily contradict one another,
Luther reasoned, they could not be truly authoritative. A critical reading of history
enabled Luther to support his theological conclusions.
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Luther considered Constance an especially odious example of the fallibility of
general councils. At Leipzig he objected to its condemnation of Hus.° In this
regard, according to Luther, Constance even contradicted itself: the council
condemned Hus's statement—"The pope is not over all the churches by divine
right"—while its own decree insisted "the council is above the pope. "61 Luther's
criticism of Constance continued long after Leipzig. In addition to questioning the
condemnation of Hus, Luther had little regard for this council because it had failed to
bring about any real reform in the church.
Some think this [the question of good works] should be referred to a general
council. To this I say, No! We have had many councils in which this has
been proposed, such as Constance, Basel, and the last Lateran council.
Nothing came of these councils and things are going from bad to worse. 62
Here Luther later saw a parallel between Constance and Nicaea. After the Arian
heresy had been condemned by Nicaea, nevertheless it continued more strongly than
before. Thinking of that continued problem Luther wrote,
That is the way we Germans fared at the Council of Constance: there the pope
was made subject to the council and was deposed, and his tyranny and simony
were strongly condemned. Yet ever since that time he is possessed by seven
more devils and his tyranny and simony have gotten off to an even better
start. 63

°On Luther's view of Hus and Constance see Kohler, 162-236.
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Constance had failed in its aim of limiting the abuse of papal authority. Luther aptly
summarized his view of this council when he referred to it as Obstantiense Concilium,
"the Obstinate Council."
Luther's arguments from history reveal a positive relationship to humanist
thought and further distance him from the fifteenth-century conciliarists. Although
Gerson referred to church history in general as providing support for the conciliar
theory, he never engaged in the detailed historical analysis that Luther undertook. In
addition, Luther's historically rooted negative assessment of Constance may have kept
him from using its decrees in his fight against the papacy. When Luther thought of
Constance, the first thing that came to mind was not Haec Sancta but Hus. In
addition, the failure of Constance to achieve its goal of reform in head and members
caused Luther to question the value of such councils. For him Constance cinched the
case that a general council was not a practical means for accomplishing reform.

Conclusion
Conciliar thought continued to influence the relationship between the empire
and the papacy at the beginning of the sixteenth century, and to a certain extent the
desire some had for a Reformation era council was inherited from conciliarism."
However, the impact of conciliarism on Luther himself was largely negative rather
than positive. Although he cited Gerson often, especially in the indulgence

'A play on the Latin "Constantiense Concilium," Spruche wider das Konstanzer
Konzil, WA 39,1:13.
'Johns, 100.
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controversy with regard to penance, Gerson's conciliar ecclesiology was finally of no
significance for him.' Luther probably had not even read any of the great conciliar
treatises of the preceding century. Whether this was because his teachers dared not
recommend such material to him must remain a matter of speculation." Only
Luther's first appeal to a future council shows even a hint of conciliar thought. But
events quickly overtook this appeal, and at Leipzig Luther was forced to confront the
implications of his theology for conciliar authority. His final position on the authority
of general councils stood in complete opposition to the entire conciliar tradition.
Nevertheless, the development of Luther's thought in this matter provides an
important case study in the relationship between Renaissance and Reformation. In the
end, Luther's arguments reveal he had discarded those influences that were so
important for Gerson—nominalism and mysticism. Instead Luther had embraced the
humanist disciplines that led him back into the biblical texts. He did battle with the
papacy armed with scripture in its original languages and wielding arguments from
history rather than the decrees of Constance.

66KOhler

states that Gerson was significant for Luther as "Kirchenpolitik" but with
reference to Gerson's teaching on penance and the liberating effect it had on Luther, 344.
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